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ABSTRACT
This thesis starts with noting that the rapid globalisation of the late twentieth and the  twenty-
first century has resulted in a shift from a national to an international level concerning certain 
issues. Local governments find themselves unable to control the risk of radioactive pollution 
that vessels traversing their coastline pose. The purpose of this thesis is to examine to which 
extent a coastal state can influence an  en route transport of spent nuclear fuel. It examines 
four  possible  degrees  of  control;  an  unconditional  ban,  prior  informed  consent,  prior 
information and no information. Secondly, it also examines how the en route state influence 
varies in the territorial waters, the EEZ and adjacent high seas.
After assessing nuclear law, maritime law and environmental law first on a principal level, 
secondly by looking into the actual legislation and case law; this thesis finds that the question 
currently is uncertain. It is however clear that the coastal states does not have any influence in 
adjacent high seas. The territorial waters are under coastal states sovereign jurisdiction and 
thus, rights to influence are largest in these areas. The EEZ is a zone sui generis, a mixture 
between the regulation on the high seas and in the territorial waters, but leaves some room for 
coastal state jurisdiction on environmental issues.
The  principles  of  cooperation,  sovereignty,  prevention  and  precaution  all  provide  good 
arguments  for  that  coastal  states  shall  be  entitled  to  receive  prior  notice  or  give  a  prior 
informed consent to a scheduled shipment. Recent EC law and the law of Chile and a few 
other countries also prescribe a procedure of prior information and consent. However, the 
main conflict is that with the principles of free navigation and innocent passage that limits the 
coastal states sovereignty in its territorial waters and the EEZ. 
The main conclusion of this thesis is that although the rights of coastal states to control  en 
route shipments of spent nuclear fuel does not gain full support by the current patchwork of 
controlling legislation, there are several indications that this is about to change. The 2006 
changes of EC legislation is one important move towards a duty of prior informed consent. 
Another  is  the  non  sequitur  evident  in  that  prior  informed consent  to en  route  states  is 
mandatory when it comes to the transportation of other hazardous wastes, regulated in the 
Basel Convention.
2
CONTENTS
ABSTRACT.............................................................................................................................. 2
CONTENTS..............................................................................................................................3
ABBREVIATIONS..................................................................................................................5
1. INTRODUCTION...............................................................................................................6
1.1. Background.............................................................................................................. 6
1.2. Current Trends........................................................................................................ 7
1.3. Purpose..................................................................................................................... 8
1.4. Delimitations...........................................................................................................8
1.5. Structure and Methods.......................................................................................... 9
2: PRINCIPLES ON NAVAL TRANSPORT OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL................. 11
2.1. Introduction..........................................................................................................  11
2.2. Background to Nuclear law................................................................................ 11
The Dual Focus of Nuclear law............................................................................. 11
Principles of Nuclear law.......................................................................................12
The Safety Principle...............................................................................................13
The Security Principle and Coastal State Trust....................................................14
Does the Security Principle imply obscurity?.......................................................14
Can dialogue substitute obscurity according to the Security Principle?.............. 16
The Transparency Principle.................................................................................. 16
The Transparency Principle in USA, Sweden and Germany............................... 17
Regulation through disclosure – an economic argument...................................... 18
Not-in-my-back-yard-symptom or informed consent?..........................................19
Compliance Principle and the Principle of International Cooperation................. 20
Conclusions............................................................................................................20
2.3. Background to Navigational Rights................................................................. 21
The indivisibility of the oceans.............................................................................. 21
Permanency........................................................................................................... 22
Flexibility...............................................................................................................22
Conclusions........................................................................................................... 23
2.4. Background to Environmental Law.................................................................. 24
Principles of Environmental law...........................................................................24
The Principle of State Sovereignty/Obligation not to cause damage.................... 25
The Principle of Cooperation................................................................................. 26
The Preventive Principle....................................................................................... 27
The Precautionary Principle..................................................................................27
2.5. General Conclusions on principles concerning 
naval transports of nuclear materials............................................................. 30
3
3. LEGISLATION APPLIED AND CASE LAW ANALYSIS........................................ 31
3.1. Introduction...........................................................................................................31
3.2. UNCLOS revisited............................................................................................... 31
The Territorial Waters – Non-innocent passage................................................... 31
The Territorial Waters – Innocent passage........................................................... 33
The Territorial Waters – Conclusions................................................................... 34
The High Seas........................................................................................................ 34
The Exclusive Economic Zone...............................................................................34
Exclusive Economic Zones and Marine Pollution according to 
Part XII UNCLOS................................................................................................ 35
International Agreements and Competent International Organisations 
in the UNCLOS.....................................................................................................36
Article 211.5 UNCLOS.........................................................................................36
Article 23 UNCLOS..............................................................................................38
Special remarks concerning a ban on Nuclear Transports and
Art 195 UNCLOS................................................................................................. 38
Conclusions........................................................................................................... 39
3.3. Regulations concerning the transport of Spent Nuclear Fuel
beyond the UNCLOS.........................................................................................39
Notification Systems..............................................................................................40
Transport related legislation................................................................................. 40
Conclusions........................................................................................................... 41
3.4. Case law..................................................................................................................42
Reservations according to Art 310 UNCLOS.......................................................42
The MOX plant case..............................................................................................43
The Precautionary Principle..................................................................................44
EU and the Precautionary Principle – Are there special
conditions in the European Union?...................................................................... 46
The Basel Convention............................................................................................ 47
3.5. Evaluation and Conclusions...............................................................................49
4. REFLECTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS....................................................................... 50
4.1. Reflections............................................................................................................. 50
4.2. Conclusions........................................................................................................... 51
4.3. Postscript................................................................................................................ 52
APPENDIX I: RESERVATIONS UPON RATIFICATION OF THE UNCLOS.........53
APPENDIX II: CHILE’S LAW FOR NUCLEAR SAFETY............................................. 56
REFERENCES........................................................................................................................ 57
4
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EC European Community
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1: INTRODUCTION
The  rapid  globalisation  of  late  has  altered  the  concept  of  risk.  The  twenty-first  century 
civilisation is explained as being a world risk society.1 This description is a reflection on how 
problems that  until  recently  was  perceived  as  local,  increasingly  is  found to  have  global 
impact. In the environmental area, this is reflected in a fear that manufactured products pose a 
potentially irreversible threat to the habitat of man. Characteristic of these risks are that they 
are surrounded by a scientific uncertainty as to the effects or the probability of an incident; 
consider  the  examples  of  genetically  modified  foodstuffs,  greenhouse  gas  emissions  and 
nuclear power plants. At the same time, consummation of the risk implies damages that are 
potentially irreversible beyond a surveyable time.
The globalisation has contributed to a shift in focus from a local to a global level, enabling the 
world society to realise that also small emissions, causing an indeterminate damage locally, 
may for example contribute to the global  warming or the stratification of the Baltic  Sea. 
However, the globalisation has also resulted in a greater mobility of products; thus resulting in 
an increased risk globally, that is not always reflected on a national level. 
Most national governments, at least those of a democratic character, have national systems 
promoting legal security, transparency and control mechanisms as to mitigate environmental 
damages.2 This is conceived as one of the cornerstones of a functioning democratic society. 
However, as risks are increasingly becoming a global problem, there is a democratic deficit in 
the system. Local governments experience a lack of control over risks posed by transboundary 
pollution; as the system enforcing rights of foreign citizens, or their governments, is not as 
developed as national control systems are. 
The problem becomes especially prominent  when the risk does not emanate from a point 
source, such as a nuclear plant on the other side of the border; but instead is a mobile source 
of risk, such as a ship loaded with highly radioactive cargo. This will be the topic of this 
thesis.
1.1. Background  
The issue of transport of spent nuclear fuel is controversial; involving several dichotomies on 
both legislative and political level. Primarily, the hazardous nature of the cargo gives rise to 
concerns  regarding  security.  Business  organizations  often  emphasize  that  the  transport  of 
nuclear materials is exceptionally safe and that no major accident has occurred during almost 
half a century of transports.3 Environmental Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) admits 
to this fact but focus on that the risk is still too high considering that the effects of a major 
accident would be grave and irreversible.4
Secondly,  nuclear  fuel  has  dual  fields  of  use.  In  addition  to  a  peaceful  application  in 
producing energy, it can also be converted into a weapon.5 Due to the last decades perceived 
1 Mason, M., New Accountability: Environmental Responsibility Across Borders, Earthscan Canada, 2005, p 
1.
2 Mason, M., p 1-2.
3 See  for  example  World  Nuclear  Transport  Institute,  (On  their  front  page,  6  August  2007:  ”45  years, 
Transport of Nuclear Materials, carried out safely and reliably”), http://www.wnti.co.uk/
4 See for example Greenpeace, http://www.greenpeace.org/international/news/nuclear-transports-endanger-pa
5 Primarily it  is  possible to construct  a radiological  dispersal  device;  combining the nuclear material  with 
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threat of terrorists; concerns about cargo ending up in the wrong hands are increasing. This 
fear leads shipping countries to the conclusion that an increased secrecy about the shipments 
is necessary. Due to that transports are perceived to be under a greater threat than previously 
they also pose a greater risk for the coastal countries. Therefore, coastal states are anxious to 
know what transports that take place in their regions.
 
Furthermore, to use or not to use nuclear power is a political decision. Where some countries, 
such as Finland, are expanding; others are planning to phase out their nuclear programs. A 
third category is principally against the use of nuclear energy and declares their states to be 
nuclear free zones. Especially for this last category, it is provoking to be exposed to the risk 
entailed in ships navigating off their coasts, loaded with spent nuclear fuel; after all, they have 
nationally decided to opt out from this hazard.
Finally,  in  terms  of  maritime  law  shipments  of  spent  nuclear  fuel  actualize  the  conflict 
between a coastal states right to protect its shoreline versus the vessels right to free navigation 
and  innocent  passage.  This  is  essentially  a  conflict  between  old  navigational  principles 
restated in the law of the sea and recently emerging principles of environmental law, which 
questions the current balance between flag states and the coastal states in the area of vessel 
control. 
1.2. Current trends  
Lately the international environmental debate has taken a turn in favour of nuclear power. In 
the light of a threatening global warming, some argue that nuclear power may be necessary as 
an alternative to other sources of energy that release more carbon into the atmosphere.6 At the 
same time, there is still no universal solution for what to do with the spent nuclear fuel, piling 
up as a consequence of the worlds increasing nuclear  capacity.  The solutions range from 
reprocessing to terminal storage via new trends such as transmutation; the latter a method to 
reduce the amount of ultrahazardous waste that normally is a by-product of the reprocessing 
procedure. 
Common for  all  solutions  are  that  they  may  involve  transboundary  transports.  The  most 
frequent reason for transboundary transportation is currently reprocessing, as not all countries 
have their own reprocessing plant. Transmutation is still a technique on the drafting board. 
However, the size, complexity and costs of constructing such a plant would not make it viable 
for every country to build its own, should the technique become a real alternative. Moreover, 
although many countries have plans on building their own deep storage facilities, the siting 
have met strong opposition by local stakeholders. As a consequence of this, and motivated by 
the prospective to increase security by having only one or a few places for terminal storage, 
the IAEA regularly recommends that a common depository should be created. Finally, it shall 
be noted that  the US Department of  Energy’s  GNEP proposal  suggest  a  form of  nuclear 
leasing; that some countries should hire nuclear fuel, returning it to its country of origin after 
use, rather than building own facilities for final storage or reprocessing.7
As a conclusion,  the recent  developments  and current  proposals  for the future of nuclear 
regular explosives, to spread radiation over a larger area. Secondly it is possible to produce nuclear weapons, 
which however would demand advanced equipment for reprocessing. 
6 See as an example of this the recent report on the climate change; nuclear power plants are mentioned as a 
key mitigation technology. IPCC, 2007. Climate change 2007: Mitigation, p 14.
7 See http://www.gnep.energy.gov/ for more information on the GNEP program. 
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energy  indicates  that  it  is  likely  to  increase  or  at  least  remain  on  its  current  levels.  As 
demonstrated in the above examples, the amount of transboundary transports is hence also 
likely to increase. Therefore it is important to analyze the adequacy of the current legislation 
in advance. One particularly important question concerning transports of spent nuclear fuel is 
to what extent stakeholders along the planned route has opportunity to influence the choice of 
route, the standards of safety and perhaps even to implement their own safeguard routines, to 
alleviate the effects of a possible accident.
1.3. Purpose  
In June 2007 AB SVAFO announces that they intend to transport spent nuclear fuel from 
Sweden to Sellafield, Great Britain, for reprocessing. Disregarding the anomaly that such a 
transport is in Sweden, due to the national principle of self-sufficiency in the field of nuclear 
energy; the final words of the press release evokes a few questions.8 Freely translated, the 
sentence reads as follows; “Concerned authorities along the route will be kept informed”.9 A 
priori,  this sounds both logical  and uncontroversial;  but as will be shown throughout this 
thesis,  there is no binding obligation for a party shipping spent nuclear fuel to inform all 
countries en route to the country of destination.10
First of all, it shall be noted that in this thesis using the term  en route  state is a conscious 
choice. This serves the purpose of distinguishing the group of countries referred to in this 
thesis from two similar categories; the transit state and the coastal state. The en route state is 
naturally also a coastal state, but with the qualification that it is neither the country of origin 
nor destination; its ports are never intended to be called. The transit state is characterized by 
that it is passed through, although not being the final destination. Transit states are defined 
differently in different treaties; sometimes it is taken to mean only internal waters or on the 
actual terra firma; others are vaguer thus possibly including also the territorial waters or even 
the EEZs.
The purpose of this thesis is to examine to which extent an en route country can influence a 
transport of spent nuclear fuel. Working from the assumption that access to information is the 
key to influence, I have chosen to examine four possible degrees of control; an unconditional 
ban, prior informed consent, prior information and no information. Secondly, how far from 
the coast line does the  en route state control reach; the territorial waters, the EEZ or even 
beyond, to adjacent high seas? 
Focus will be on what room for manoeuvre that en route states have to exercise control over 
their  waters  within  the UNCLOS and if  it  is  possible  to  expand the a  priori  reading by 
introducing environmental principles, such as the precautionary principle.  
1.4. Delimitations  
Out of the around 20 million transports of nuclear materials that takes place each year, 95 % 
8 Concerning the self-sufficiency principle  in  Sweden,  see  R-07-11:  Cramér,  P.,  Stendahl,  S.,  Erhag,  T., 
“Nationellt ansvar för använt kärnbränsle i en utvidgad Europeisk Union”, SKB 2007.
9 Translation from Swedish. Press release from AB SVAFO, 2007-06-05, www.svafo.se
10 It shall be noted that it is neither clear what criteria AB SVAFO use to determine if a country is  “concerned” 
nor what kind of information these countries are entitled to, in that case.
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are unrelated to the nuclear fuel cycle.11 These transports concern low radiation materials used 
for example hospitals or industries. These transports will not be discussed in this thesis, as the 
risks involved transporting such materials are different from the risk posed by transports of 
spent nuclear fuel.  
The term spent nuclear fuel is used as to include both fuel destined for reprocessing and fuel 
destined for terminal storage. In practice, there is no difference between the two, other than 
that one is defined as a product and the other as a waste. According to current legislation, they 
are; although sometimes separate in definition, in practice regulated similarly.
When discussing the transport of spent nuclear fuel, there are a number of interesting issues 
that I have chosen not to include in this analysis, due to its limited format. The question of 
liabilities in transporting nuclear fuel, should an accident happen, is not obvious. Questions on 
what should happen, who should pay and how much are among those I have left outside this 
thesis. 
As the topic is transboundary transports, aspects of national law will only be provided, should 
they contribute to the understanding of how the international system shall be interpreted. On a 
national level, there are hence many difficult and interesting questions that have been left out. 
Of  particular  interest,  although  unfortunately  left  out,  is  the  question  of  the  imbalance 
between import and export restrictions on spent nuclear fuel, both on national and EU level.
Furthermore, only transports in coastal states territorial water, its EEZ or on the adjoining 
high seas  will  be  examined in  this  thesis.  I  find  these  three  groups  to  be  representative, 
although a thorough examination also rightly should include straits and archipelagic states. 
Furthermore, as noted above, it is presumed that the en route coastal state is neither state of 
origin nor state of destination. 
Finally,  this  thesis  focuses  on  the  en  route states  rights  to  receive  advance  information, 
consultation or ban an en route passage. There are a number of adjoining questions that can 
and should be posed; such as if it is possible to demand stricter environmental standards than 
is imposed by the vessels’ flag state and how they could be designed and in what ways they 
then should be enforced. However the actuality of such questions is dependent on the primary 
assumption that the coastal state has access to information and therefore, this thesis will focus 
on that initial premise. As previously noted, access to information is the first step towards 
influence. 
1.5. Structure and Methods
The topic  of  this  thesis,  to  analyze  what  possibilities  an en route coastal  state  has  to  be 
informed about, and influence on, a certain shipment of spent nuclear fuel, draws on a few 
different legal areas.12 The cargo studied is spent nuclear fuel; this naturally indicates that the 
area of nuclear law needs to be consulted. The nuclear field is special; the specific hazards of 
nuclear  material,  combined  with  a  shift  from the  secrecy  of  a  military  product  into  the 
transparency of the public sphere has had profound influence on its governing principles.
11 Statistics from the World Nuclear Transport Institute, http://www.wnti.co.uk/index.php?pageID=72
12 As mentioned in the delimitations, the transnational character of the transports indicates that it is only the 
international legislations that are considered.
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Secondly, there is the transport angle; as this thesis is limited to naval transports, this implies 
maritime law. Maritime law is  an old field of law, with well  established principles many 
which has long been a part  of international  customary law; however,  that have also been 
questioned by coastal states, in the context of environmental protection. 
This,  as well  as the hazards of transporting radioactive material  and the hazards of naval 
transport as such, indicate that also environmental law must be taken into consideration. This 
comparatively new field of law has evolved quickly during recent decades; its principles are 
not yet settled, in the same way as principles in for example maritime law. At the same time, 
there are also customary principles of international law, such as the principle of cooperation, 
that may be relevant to environmental protection. 
Due to the disparate set of legal areas that are examined; this thesis begins with a chapter13 
analyzing  what  principles  that  each  area  provides  that  are  of  interest  to  the  shipment  of 
nuclear materials. The purpose of this is to provide the reader with an insight in what overlaps 
and what differences that exist between and within the areas, on a principal level. 
Discussing these principles also provides an opportunity to illustrate why coastal states want 
prior  information  or  control.  However,  the  underlying  reasons  are  not  limited  to  legal 
arguments; therefore the explanations sometimes use arguments from other social sciences. 
This thesis is not meant to provide a complete catalog of interdisciplinary reasons, instead, 
when  given  they  shall  be  considered  as  examples  of  circumstances  that  are  relevant  in 
assessing the adequacy of the law in force. 
Next, Chapter 3 sets out to find the applicable legal rules. After a preliminary conclusion, 
based on existing legal conventions and articles, case law and other practical examples are 
examined. This is  done through examining the validity,  according to international  law, of 
previously cited arguments that coastal states have used to alter the route of a vessel with 
nuclear  cargo.  The  sources  in  this  chapter  are  mainly  legal  texts,  precedents,  legislative 
history and doctrine. 
After  assessing  different  approaches  in  Chapter  3,  the  final  chapter  will  sum  up  the 
conclusions of this thesis as well as provide some general comments as to the current situation 
and the interesting effects that are the result of the discrepancy between law and diplomatics 
in international law. 
Finally, it shall be noted that due to the specific nature of the subject, this thesis is based on 
material drawing from several disparate sources. This wide scope was unavoidable due to the 
fact  that  the area currently  is  in transition.  It  is  now a patchwork of separate controlling 
mechanisms constituting  a  rudimentary  legal  base,  but  as  this  thesis  will  show,  there  are 
indications on many different levels that it is about to transform. Hence, in this thesis I have 
used both soft law declarations, international customary principles, international and regional 
treaties  as  well  as  national  legislation.  Similarly,  I  have  reviewed  both  case  law  from 
international  tribunals  as  well  as  examples  from international  practice,  yet  to  be  tried  by 
arbitrators or judges. To a large extent I have tried to combine the separate conclusions drawn 
in the area of maritime law, international law, environmental law and nuclear law by scholars 
within their respective field to reach conclusions on how these separate areas combine. 
13 Chapter 2.
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2. PRINCIPLES ON NAVAL TRANSPORT OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS
2.1. Introduction  
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a theoretical background to the legal investigation in 
Chapter 3. The question posed in the introduction; to analyse what possibilities an en route 
coastal state has to be informed about, and given influence on, a certain shipment of spent 
nuclear fuel, clearly evokes the need to investigate several legal areas. It is not a question that 
can be solved by only taking into consideration for example, maritime law.   
The regulation of naval transports of spent nuclear fuel draws primarily from three areas of 
law; nuclear law, maritime law and environmental law. In addition to this, the transboundary 
nature  of  the  transports  in  question  also  actualises  issues  of  public  international  law. 
Naturally, these areas are not isolated units, but must all be considered in order to find what 
right  coastal  states  have  to  influence  a  particular  shipment.  In  the  following  sections,  a 
background will be provided to how the different legal disciplines have addressed the risks of 
transporting nuclear materials.  As this thesis is limited to international transports, national 
legislation will not be discussed unless it is relevant to the transnational level.  
This initial chapter will introduce the basic principles that characterises the areas of nuclear 
law and environmental law; the section on maritime law will introduce freedom of navigation 
and  innocent  passage.  There  are  different  kinds  of  principles;  those  that  are  narrow and 
technical; those that are recognized in hard law, soft law, regional or national law. There are 
furthermore principles existing in several areas of law, such as the duty not to harm other 
countries environments, but also principles specific to one particular section of an area of law; 
such  as  the  ALARA-principle  used  in  nuclear  law defining  that  risk  of  radiation  should 
always be kept “as low as reasonably achievable”.14 However, in this initial chapter, I shall 
not  discriminate  between  different  types  of  principles;  the  purpose  is  not  to  identify  the 
positive  legislation,  but  to  indicate  the  issues  that  needs  to  be  taken  into  account  when 
considering a coastal states right to interfere with another states transportation scheme.
This chapter will therefore stay on a general level; a detailed review of specific regulations as 
well  as a  discussion on previous case law will  be done in the next  chapter.  Instead,  this 
chapter will focus on highlighting the basic concepts that overlap or are in contradiction with 
each other. This will hopefully serve to provide the reader with insight in what interests that 
lie behind the specific articles and legislations which will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
2.2. Background to Nuclear Law  
The Dual Focus of Nuclear law
The area of nuclear law is characterized by the fact that the object of legislation is a substance 
inherently  dangerous to  the  safety  of  people,  animals  and the  environment  in  general.  A 
radiological accident could lead to serious damage, contaminating areas for an indefinite time. 
On the other hand, the usage of nuclear materials provides possible societal gains; ranging 
from many  medical  and  industrial  usages  to  nuclear  energy.  Hence,  on  a  national  level, 
14 On  the  character  of  different  principles  and  the  importance  in  separating  them,  see  de  Sadeleer,  N., 
Environmental Principles – from political slogans to legal rules, Oxford University Press Inc, New York, 
2005, p 2.
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nuclear law is dual, concerned with controlling risks, but promoting the beneficial areas of 
nuclear practice.15 On the international arena however, the issue can not be said to be this 
simple. As mentioned before, not all countries believe that the risks of nuclear energy are 
balanced by its gains. Hence, in some countries16, assessments of the dual concerns of nuclear 
law (risks and benefits) have resulted in a prohibition, rather than a regulation. This means 
that  any  nuclear  activity  that  takes  place  on  a  transnational  level,  or  that  may  have 
transnational effects, must deal with the difficult question that some countries have opted out 
of nuclear energy altogether. To these countries, it is not a question of balancing risks with 
benefits; as they have opted out of having a nuclear power programme, they have nothing to 
gain from transboundary transports of spent nuclear fuel. An en route shipment of nuclear fuel 
along their coastlines can, from this perspective, only be seen as an extra risk. 
However,  there  is  not  only  a  dichotomy  between  nuclear  and  non-nuclear  countries.  All 
countries having their own nuclear programmes also make an individual assessment of how 
risks and benefits shall be balanced. Although as will be seen below, there are a number of 
international  regulations  concerning  the  safety  of  transport;  but  whether  or  not  these  are 
followed  can  be  known  only  by  the  country  performing  the  transport.  Therefore,  also 
countries  with  own nuclear  programmes  that  are  situated  en route  of  shipments  of  spent 
nuclear fuel may rightfully have an interest in knowing when, and with what degree of safety, 
a transport is scheduled.
Principles of Nuclear law
Nuclear  materials  originally  stem  from  military  research  programmes.17 Combining  the 
historical  secrecy surrounding nuclear  research and practice with the inherently hazardous 
nature of the materials it is not difficult to understand why this area traditionally is excepted 
from more general legislation. Although the physical properties of nuclear materials do not a 
priori preclude  them  from  being  included  under  other  legislation  concerning  hazardous 
wastes,  such as  the  Basel  convention18 or  the HNS convention19,  this  is  not  the  practice. 
Instead, there is a continuous practice of special legislation in the field of nuclear activities 
which has resulted in that nuclear law can rightly be viewed as a separate area of legislation. 
At the same time, it is important to note that the division of legal areas into separate fields is 
artificial; to a greater or lesser extent, they are all influencing each other. For example, when 
considering the area of energy law, it is becoming increasingly difficult not to also integrate 
environmental  concerns  and EC law.  At  the same time,  bearing this  in  mind,  I  find that 
distinguishing an area of law as nuclear law fills the purpose of clarifying what specific blend 
of interests that needs to be balanced, notwithstanding that they draw from a multitude of 
different sources. 
Hence, there is a set of fundamental principles that outline the area of nuclear law.20 Not all of 
15 Stoiber,  C.,  Baer,  A., Pelzer,  N., Tonhauser W., Handbook on nuclear law, International Atomic Energy 
Agency, Vienna, 2003, page 3. 
16 To mention a few: New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Chile, many African and South-east Asian countries 
does not have any nuclear power plants for commercial use. However, the reason why naturally varies across 
the world. Not all countries without nuclear power plants are principally against nuclear power. 
17 Stoiber et al, p 6. 
18 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, see 
Article 1 (3). The applicability of the Basel Convention will be further discussed in Chapter 3.
19 International  Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of 
Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea, 1996, see Article 4.
20  According to Stoiber et al, these are: The safety principle, the security principle, the responsibility principle, 
the  permission  principle,  the  continuous  control  principle,  the  compensation  principle,  the  sustainable 
development principle, the compliance principle, the independence principle, the transparency principle and 
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these are relevant in the case of transboundary transports of spent nuclear fuel. However, a 
few of them deserves to  be commented upon here.  As noted above, several  principles of 
nuclear  law are in fact  also general  principles of environmental  law. This deserves  to be 
highlighted already at this point, as this is of importance later when assessing to what degree 
environmental principles can influence the classic legal field of maritime law. This influence 
of environmental law on nuclear law is quite obvious; bearing in mind that nuclear law’s basic 
premise is the dual interests. Thus, the main concern of nuclear law is balancing risks with 
benefits;  one of the main risks of nuclear  operations is  environmental  damage.  From this 
follows that nuclear law has integrated principles of environmental law. 
In the following, five principles of nuclear law shall be discussed, in the light of that they may 
affect the rights of a third country, concerned by a specific transport. As they are based on a 
national perspective, it is interesting to consider to what extent the principles expressed also 
can be said existing in transboundary relations; however, the reader should keep in mind that 
the international arena is not as thoroughly regulated as the national and thus are not all of the 
discussed principles automatically applicable on transboundary relations. The principles that 
will be reviewed are the safety principle, the security principle, the compliance principle, the 
transparency principle and the principle of international cooperation. 
The Safety Principle 
Safety is naturally the main concern in any activity dealing with nuclear materials. To ensure 
that  nuclear  activities  are  safe,  two  objects  are  in  focus;  prevention  and  protection.21 As 
nuclear materials potentially may cause harm irreparable in a foreseeable future, the main 
concern is to anticipate any risks, as to rule out accidents in beforehand. The meaning of the 
prevention principle is that caution should be taken to eliminate risks.  However,  as noted 
above, nuclear energy has a dual character. It is not possible to exclude all risk, and still enjoy 
the  benefits  of  nuclear  power.  The  principle  of  protection  deals  with  this  problem.  The 
meaning of this principle is that any action by which risks are greater than the benefits should 
be ruled out. 
As a conclusion, the safety principle does not preclude the taking of risks. It indicates that the 
level of precaution shall reflect the severity of the risk. It also indicates that some risks shall 
not be taken – those that are not compensated with a corresponding societal gain.22 
A priori,  the safety principle  is  reminiscent  of  the  environmental  precautionary principle, 
which is analysed in more detail below, in the section on environmental law. However, it shall 
be  noted  that  even  though  the  safety  principle  bears  resemblance  to  the  precautionary 
principle, the latter has a wider scope. The precautionary principle is an expansion of the 
prevention principle,  often formulated  as a  reversed burden of proof.23 In the example of 
transporting spent nuclear fuel, the precautionary principle would state that the shipper must 
prove  that  the  transport  will  not  damage  the  health  or  safety  of  people,  animals  or  the 
environment.
Finally, it deserves to be repeated that the safety principle involves weighing benefits against 
risks. Some countries have decided that the risks involved in supporting nuclear power are too 
big.  The  degree  of  safety  in  others  is  nationally  decided;  taking  into  account  existing 
the international cooperation principle. See Stoiber et al, p 5.
21 Stoiber et al, p 6.
22 Stoiber et al, p 6.
23 Louka,  E.,  International  Environmental  Law:  Fairness,  Effectiveness  and  World  Order,  Cambridge 
University Press, 2006, p 50. 
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international  legislation.  In  the  case  of  transboundary  transportations,  this  is  a  source  to 
conflicts as the non-nuclear countries are subjected to a risk lacking a corresponding national 
benefit. 
The Security Principle and Coastal State trust
The security principle is concerned with preventing the abuse of nuclear materials. The tenor 
of this is that any country having nuclear materials must also make sure that it is not lost, 
stolen  or  used  in  a  non-peaceful  way.24,25 The  safety  and  security  issues  prompted  by  a 
transboundary transport of spent nuclear fuel are abundant and divergent. However, they can 
be roughly divided into a few different types of dangers. First of all there are the internal 
dangers  of  the  material  and  the  specific  dangers  of  the  maritime  transport;  this  includes 
navigational  errors,  choice  of  route,  hard  weather  etc.  Precautionary  measures  include 
legislation on containers, packaging and control over external radiation levels. 
Secondly,  the  risks  posed  by  external  actors  –  pirate  or  terrorist  attacks  knowing  or 
unknowing of  the  cargo’s  nature.  An example  of  the  vulnerability  of  vessels  to  external 
interruption is the  Pacific Swan.  The vessel was boarded by members of Greenpeace on its 
way through the Panama Canal in 1998.26 Although the environmentalists posed no threat to 
the journey as such, the incident served to put a focus on the malfunctioning of safety routines 
aboard the ship. 
Moreover, for coastal states, another perceived threat is that of internal errors or misconducts 
on behalf of the transporters; in other words, that safety and security prescriptions are not 
properly  executed.  This  has  proven  to  be  a  rational  fear  –  for  example,  in  1999  it  was 
discovered that British Nuclear Fuels, shipping MOX fuel to Japan, had falsified many of 
their cargo safety inspection records.27 The Pacific Swan incident mentioned above is another 
example. 
As a conclusion so far, the security principle designates the shipper as responsible for making 
sure that safety and security is maintained until the ship reaches its destination. However, 
incidents show that coastal states not necessarily can trust that this responsibility is properly 
executed. 
Does the security principle imply obscurity?
Security in  nuclear  law has long equalled secrecy.  In this  section,  two examples shall  be 
considered,  illustrating  how non-transparency can be  motivated  with  the  argument  that  it 
24 It is worth noting that this does not only entail terrorist prevention. Several examples show how radioactive 
products that have been illegally dumped or abandoned without sufficient markings pose perhaps an even 
bigger threat. An example of this is the tragic Goiânia incident in Brazil in 1987; radioactive materials were 
left behind in a former radiotherapy institute. Scavengers found the material and tried to dismantle it, hoping 
to find something of value. Several people died or suffered severe symptoms after coming into contact with 
the material. The casualties were due to the lack of information – had it been known that it was a deadly 
substance, most likely,  no harm would have been done. This is of course another argument in favour of 
transparency.  Nuclear  materials  do have a  tendency to  do the  most  damage when handled by someone 
unaware  of  its  hazardous  nature.  For  more  information on the Goiânia  incident,  see  “The Radiological  
Accident in Goiânia”, IAEA, Vienna, 1988.
25 Stoiber et al, p 7.
26 Dixon, D. B., ”Transnational Shipments of Nuclear Materials by Sea: Do Current Safeguards Provide Coastal 
States  a  Right  to  Deny Innocent  Passage?”,  George Washington  University,  Paper  1794,  bepress  Legal 
Series,  2006,  p  8  and  O’Neill,  K.,  “International  Waste  transportation:  Flashpoints,  Controversies,  and 
Lessons.” Environment 41, no. 4, pp 12-15, 34-39, 1999. See section ”The Voyage of the Pacific Swan.” 
27 Dixon, D. B., p 9.
14
increases security. The first example to be considered is the US GNEP policy. Secondly, an 
example  of  security  from a  high  risk  perspective  will  be  examined  –  transporting  spent 
nuclear fuel through Colombia. However, it is interesting to also keep in mind the  Pacific  
Swan  incident and the falsified cargo safety protection protocols discussed in the previous 
section. Or in other words, secrecy in transporting nuclear materials rests upon one important 
premise; that the shipper follows internationally prescribed safety requirements in good faith. 
However, this has not always been the case in the past – so can en route coastal states and 
other stakeholders be sure that this is the case in the future; particularly if the number of 
actors and packages increase?
Due to nuclear law’s historical background as a military research area, there has long been a 
tradition of absolute confidentiality. Due to the possible double usage areas for nuclear power 
(both peaceful and military purposes) this is to some extent still the case.28 An example of this 
is the US GNEP policy. The point of this policy is to discourage potential nuclear weapon 
nations from creating such, by offering them to lease nuclear fuel for peaceful purposes. The 
creation  of  nuclear  weapons  demands  apart  from  extensive  knowledge  in  the  field,  a 
reprocessing plant. Therefore, the motivation goes, should only some countries, that already 
have nuclear weapons (such as the USA) reprocess nuclear fuel. Other countries (such as Iran) 
would be better off leasing fuel from other countries, not needing to invest in an expensive, 
complicated and dangerous facility. A collateral effect of this is that the chances of a leasing 
country to develop nuclear weapons of their own decreases; thus increasing chances that the 
non-proliferation goal is achieved.29 As a conclusion, the GNEP is concerned with security on 
two different levels. Primarily, by keeping knowledge about reprocessing procedures secret 
and encouraging that reprocessing is only done in a few countries, security concerning nuclear 
weapons proliferation is increased. Secondly, as final depositories also will be limited to a 
few countries, the possibility that spent nuclear fuel deviates due to theft decreases. However, 
it  shall  simultaneously be noted that  nuclear  leasing programmes  increase  the length  and 
number of hazardous transports.30 It can be said that part of the risks that previously only 
concerned the leasing countries, is shifted on to the countries en route of the shipments. 
It shall be noted though, that the GNEP is not an entirely new concept. The US Atoms for 
Peace program had a similar function; to repatriate spent nuclear fuel to the US, in order to 
prevent nuclear proliferation.31 The repatriation of nuclear materials was however suspended 
during over a decade, due to US internal affairs; mainly the difficulties in finding a long term 
solution for storage of the waste.32 In 1996, the program was partly resumed;  one of the 
transports listed to take place was a shipment from a research reactor in Bogotá, Colombia, to 
the USA.33 Colombia is a high risk country due to a combination of natural hazards and a high 
guerrilla  activity.  Múnera  et  al cites  three  main  methods  of  decreasing  the  risks  of 
transportation; confidentiality, low profile and disinformation. Furthermore they claim that a 
“measure of the success of  [their] strategy to guarantee confidentiality and low profile is  
given by the complete absence of news in the press.”34 
28 Stoiber et al, p 6.
29  Beaufoy, M.,”Is the Law of the Sea ready for Nuclear Leasing?”, Vol 3, pp 91-117, 2006, p 91-92. See also 
the GNEP homepage for more details about the program: http://www.gnep.energy.gov/gnepProgram.html
30 Lind, Johan, Lösning eller låsning – Frågan om kärnavfall i några länder, SKB, 2006, p 70.
31 Múnera, H. A., Canal, M. B., Muños, M.,”Risks Associated with Transportation of Spent Nuclear Fuel Under 
Demanding Security Constraints: The Colombian Experience”, Risk Analysis, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp 381-389, 
1997, p 381-382.
32 O’Neill, K., see Section”Reactivating U.S. Take-Back of Research Reactor Fuel from Abroad.”
33 Múnera et al, p 381.
34 Múnera et al, p 388.
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Múnera  et  al  hence  proposes  the  classical  security  argument  in  nuclear  law,  promoting 
secrecy. To put this into perspective, Múnera et al also reports that in one day, the guerrilla 
burnt  18  random  trucks.35 The  transport  of  nuclear  fuel  luckily  escaped  this,  as  it  was 
transported by air. However, transport by truck was also an option. The fact that the nuclear 
transport passed by unharmed seems to me largely depend on luck, something that is also 
alluded in the article. Hence, note that as no-one knew about the nuclear materials, it is quite 
possible that if a truck of nuclear materials was attacked by the guerrilla; harm would have 
been caused because the character of the cargo was unknown. At the same time, I accept the 
point made by Múnera et al, that knowledge of the cargo may well have prompted an attack, 
rather than deterring it. It is furthermore possible to argue that the great risk in this example is 
not an argument for secrecy, but an argument for publicity.  According to the principle of 
transparency, which is discussed more in the next section, it is especially important to inform 
the public about circumstances that pose a risk to their health, safety or the environment.
Can dialogue substitute obscurity according to the security principle?
As seen above, there are well founded reasons why transports of nuclear fuel has taken place 
in secrecy in the past. However, there are also legitimate reasons why coastal states should be 
concerned about how transports take place. In national legislation, many countries have tried 
to solve this conflict with information to, and deliberation with stakeholders. Finally, it shall 
be noted that a dialogue between nuclear shipping states and coastal states may contrary to the 
tradition of obscurity, increase security. Through dialogue it would be possible to cooperate 
on issues such as choice of route, possibility of safe harbours or tugboats, should the sea or 
the weather indicate that this is necessary. Dialogue could also be a means for coastal states to 
gain insight in safety procedures; increasing their trust in that the manoeuvres are performed 
in good faith. They would also have a chance to institute special contingency plans, as to 
mitigate potential damages. 
The Transparency Principle 
It is difficult to address the transparency principle without mentioning the security principle as 
they historically have been considered to be in conflict with each other. Often, passing on 
information about something to the public also means that different security measures must be 
employed.  Where  the  security  principle  draws  on  the  military  background  of  nuclear 
operations; the transparency principle is a product of the introduction of peaceful usage areas 
for  nuclear  power.  Nuclear  security  has  often  been  another  word  for  confidentiality. 
Transparency on the other hand, is based on two premises. First of all, due to the hazards of 
nuclear operations, the public has a right to know about any incidents that may affect their 
safety or environment. Secondly, public resistance and fear is often considered to be based on 
insufficient knowledge; therefore, information is the main method of legitimizing the use of 
nuclear power.36 
However,  as  hinted,  the  transparency principle  is  not  a  principle  of  total  disclosure.  The 
transparency objective shall rather be balanced with the other objectives of nuclear law, such 
as security and safety. At the same time, the nuclear industry have moved out of the shadow 
of military obscurity into the public sector resulting in that the public now has new demands 
on knowledge of any nuclear activity within their immediate surroundings.
35 Múnera et al, p 388.
36 Stoiber et al, p 10.
16
The Transparency Principle in the USA, Sweden and Germany
To grasp the meaning of how the transparency principle shall be interpreted it is useful to 
discuss a few examples on national level. However, since the issue of public deliberation in 
the context of national nuclear waste transportations would provide enough material  for a 
thesis on its own, it shall be noted that the focus here is only to illustrate how the transparency 
principle may express itself locally. The reason why these examples are interesting to study in 
the case of transboundary transportation is that the risks involved are the same on both levels. 
The difference however is that in one case, stakeholders are national citizens and in the other, 
stakeholders are citizens of other countries. Hence, it is interesting to reflect upon how the 
right to information or deliberation changes when it  is transformed from a national to an 
international  transport.  At this point,  we shall  briefly examine three examples  of how the 
transparency principle has been used in three countries, USA, Germany and Sweden. 
In an American context,  it  is  “widely recognized that a broad range of stakeholders  and 
tribes should be involved in this kind of decision”37. Issues that were considered in the study 
was  the  diversity  of  different  stakeholders,  the  difficulties  of  communicating  advanced 
technical information and a worry that stakeholders would not be willing to participate in a 
discussion.  However,  they  did  participate  and  Drew  et  al draw  the  conclusion  that 
“Meaningful  involvement  requires  that  decision  processes  and  technical  information  be 
transparent and accessible to a wide range of potential participants.”38 There is however no 
doubt that meanwhile there are difficulties in finding a suitable form for communication of 
information; information must be communicated before a decision is made, in accordance 
with the principle of transparency. 
In contrast to this, there is the example of a decision to ship spent nuclear fuel to final storage 
in Gorleben, Germany. In this case, the government presented a finalised plan – something 
that awoke fierce opposition to the extent that the public authorities found it necessary to 
declare a moratorium and search for another solution.39 What I wish to highlight with this 
example  is  not  so  much  the  fact  that  the  lack  of  deliberation  rendered  this  transport 
impossible.  Rather,  the point here is that although the German government knew that the 
decided transports was going to raise concerns among the public, there never seemed to be a 
doubt about that people had a right to know what was planned. Hence, although the German 
approach to transparency did not include deliberation, such as the American example above; 
public information was clearly a part of the German interpretation of a transparency policy. 
In Sweden, investigation and deliberation on where to site a final storage and how to transport 
the spent nuclear fuel there has been going on for many years. Since 1999, focus has been on 
three  areas  selected  for  deeper  studies.40 The  reports  are  published,  including  reports  of 
questions asked in focus groups, public meetings and generally submitted from a concerned 
public.41 This is a result of the Swedish environmental legislation42 which prescribes that an 
37 Drew, C. H., Grace, D. A., Silbernagel, S. M., Hemmings, E. S., Smith, A., Griffith,W. C,Takaro, T. K., 
Faustman, E. M., “Nuclear Waste Transportation: Case Studies of Identifying Stakeholder Risk Information 
Needs”, Environmental Health Perspectives, Vol 111, No 3, pp 263-272, 2003, p 263.
38 Drew, C. H. et al, p 271.
39 O’Neill, K., see Section “Gorleben: Nuclear Transportation in Germany”.
40 SKB R-01-28: Aggeryd, I.,“Transport av radioaktiva ämnen och annat farligt gods”, Studsvik Eco & Safety 
AB, 2001. 
41 SKB  R-01-28:  Supplement,“Transport  av  radioaktiva  ämnen  och  annat  farligt  gods.  SKB:s  svar  och 
kommentarer till frågor och remissynpunkter till utredningen ”, Svensk Kärnbränslehantering AB, 2001. 
42 Miljöbalk, SFS 1998:808 (The Swedish Environmental Code), Chapter 6.
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environmental impact assessment43 and a public consultation report44 needs to be attached to 
any  application  to  construct  a  storage  area.45 In  the  area  of  international  transportation 
however, information to the public is still kept to a minimum, as noted in the press release 
from SVAFO cited in the introduction.46 Although acknowledging that a transport is about to 
take  place,  time  and  route  are  unknown.  Interestingly,  however,  they  also  state  that 
“concerned authorities” will be kept informed. However, we have no way of knowing what 
countries that SVAFO considers to be concerned. 
As a conclusion, it seems to vary how and to what extent countries find deliberation to be a 
part  of  the transparency principle.  However,  it  seems that  the transparency principle  at  a 
minimum  at  least  includes  the  duty  to  prior  information  to  the  public.  Returning  to  the 
reasoning  above;  if  there  is  a  duty  of  prior  information  to  concerned  national  citizens, 
according to the transparency principle; does this not also imply that a similar duty should 
exist  towards  concerned  citizens  or  governments,  in  the  event  of  transboundary 
transportation? If this is not the case, is there a risk that safety standards are set at a different 
level for international transportation than for national?  
Regulation through disclosure – an economic argument
Furthermore, drawing from environmental economics, there is also a third argument in favour 
of disclosing information about transports. As has been indicated in the section on the security 
principle; transparency can increase security, as it provides the shipper with an incentive to 
make  sure  that  all  safety  and  security  prescriptions  are  followed  in  good  faith.  Hence 
transparency mitigates the chances of such incidents as the falsified cargo safety inspection 
records discussed above. 
Many countries have recently applied different programmes to increase public disclosure of 
information relating to environmental damage; the Indonesian Program for Pollution Control 
Evaluation and Rating47 and the U.S. Toxics Release Inventory Program48 are examples of 
this. Common for initiatives of this type are that they try to discourage a certain behaviour 
that  is  contradictory  to  good  environmental  management  through  demanding  that 
governments or corporations disclose information about any such actions to the public. It has 
been  shown  that  the  public  exposure  helps  to  decrease  the  amount  of  pollution,  in 
combination with clear environmental legislation as a complement.49 
In the case of transporting nuclear waste, an increase in actors on the market and of amounts 
of  spent  fuel  transported  can  be  observed.  Already  today,  the  spent  fuel  market  is 
characterised by a mixture of state and private actors.50 As actors become more abundant, 
chances are that not all of them attend to international safety and security legislation. One way 
43 Swedish translation: “Miljökonsekvensbeskrivning” (also known as MKB).
44 Swedish translation: “Samrådsrapport”.
45 For a condensed description of the demands of the Swedish Environmental Code applied to nuclear facilities, 
see http://www.skb.se/default2____15521.aspx
46 See press release from AB SVAFO, 2007-06-05, www.svafo.se. However, on a side note; transboundary 
transports of spent nuclear fuel so far have been an exception in Sweden. National policy provides for self 
sustainability in the field of nuclear energy; clearly, exporting waste does not conform well to this view.
47 For  a  detailed  analysis  on  this,  see  García,  J.,  Essays  on  Asymmetric  Information  and  Environmental 
Regulation  through  Disclosure,  Economic  Studies,  Department  of  Economics,  School  of  Business, 
Economics and Law, Göteborg University, 160, 2007, chapter 2 and 3.  
48 Cohen, M. A. and Santhakumar, V., "Information Disclosure as Environmental Regulation: A Theoretical  
Analysis", 2006. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=922487, p 2. 
49 Cohen, M. A. and Santhakumar, V., p 24.
50 O’Neill, K., see concluding section. 
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of  combating  the  problem  of  internal  error  is  to  demand  that  information  about  safety 
measures and choice of route to the public or at least to concerned governments along the 
route. This way, shippers will be extra careful, as to not violate any regulations and thereby 
receive unwanted negative attention from stakeholders. At the same time, the transparency 
will  allow stakeholders to gain insight into how the transports are performed; resulting in 
increased legitimacy. Another effect that has been noted is that using a system of disclosure 
gives  actors an incentive to want  to perform better,  rather  than on par with regulations.51 
Hence,  a  transparent  system  may  lead  to  that  actors  on  their  own  initiative  take  more 
precautions than legally prescribed. 
As can be seen, viewed from this perspective, transparency reinforces security, rather than 
risking it. As the public is watching, chances are higher that safety and security regulations 
are  followed.52 Perhaps  absolute  confidentiality  increases  chances  that  terrorists  or  other 
disruptions based on outer influence are avoided. This opinion seems to gain followers as fear 
of terrorist attacks has increased in the wake of the September 11, 2001 incident.53  However, 
first  of  all,  due to the complexity  and the number of parties  involved in a transboundary 
transport of spent nuclear fuel, chances are that it will be difficult to keep secret and that 
information will leak. Secondly, confidentiality does not protect from internal mistakes; these 
have previously proven to pose no less a threat to the transport of nuclear materials than outer 
disruptions. Especially as the success of an outer disruption in the end is dependent on what 
internal safety measures that are taken. By disclosing information to the government and/or 
public of countries along the itinerary; the risk of internal errors are diminished as chances are 
that someone will discover and question them before the journey starts.  
Not-in-my-back-yard-symptom54 or informed consent?
As the above examples on the transparency principle show, there are good reasons to why a 
shipment should be preformed following prior information or perhaps even a prior informed 
consent, rather than being completed in secret. However, there are also good reasons to why 
transporters  would want to keep secrecy and to keep the number of involved parties  and 
stakeholders  to  an  absolute  minimum.  The  above  examples  from the  USA,  Sweden  and 
Germany show that national stakeholders are kept informed of transports, and in some cases 
even are invited to deliberate and thereby influence on the decisions. However, it is important 
to  mention also that  as much as these deliberations  try to legitimize  certain  transports  or 
choices of final storage sites; all nuclear power countries have a problem with finding local 
support for the construction of a final depositary.55 In other words, when people are informed 
of the risks and benefits, there is a tendency that they evaluate the risks taken differently and 
use their knowledge or influence (should they be invited to participate in the deliberation) to 
stop the transport. 
This is probably one of the main reasons to why shipping countries does not wish to surrender 
to the idea that en route coastal states may influence shipments in advance. Should they have 
this right, and should they all subscribe to a different evaluation of the risk; could they in 
principle render transports impossible. Should they not have this right, advance information 
51 Cohen, M. A. and Santhakumar, V., p 24.
52 Dasgupta, S., Wang, H., Wheeler D. R., “Disclosing Emissions Information Helps Check Pollution in Asia”
Available at: http://go.worldbank.org/FVA43SX4C0
53 Sand,  P.  H.,  The  Right  to  Know:  Environmental  Information  Disclosure  by  Government  and  Industry, 
Institute of International Law, University of Munich. Available at: 
http://www.inece.org/forumspublicaccess_sand.pdf, p 7.
54 For further details on the NIMBY attitude, see for example Louka, E., p 424. 
55 O’Neill, K., see concluding section.
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may still prompt a country to stop the shipment, notwithstanding that international law did not 
grant this right. Hence, informed consent may stop a transport already before it has departed; 
prior information may lead to that the informed country intercepts the route during the actual 
transport. What the actual delimitations provided by international law are will be discussed in 
Chapter 3. At this point it is enough to note that opinions differ on this question; shipper fear 
of interception is therefore rational simply with reference to the legal insecurity of the area. 
The Compliance Principle and the Principle of International Cooperation 
Finally, there are two principles concerned directly with the external relations of a state. The 
signification of the compliance principle is that a country has a duty to implement and comply 
with international agreements.56 Furthermore, it is said to also contain the customary law that 
indicates that no country is allowed to use its own land in such a way that it adversely affects 
another country’s sovereignty. The customary rule of state sovereignty will be discussed in 
more detail in the section about environmental principles. 
The  principle  of  international  cooperation  is  closely  corresponding  to  the  compliance 
principle.  Where  the  compliance  principle  prescribes  that  a  country  must  make  sure  that 
international legislation is implemented and followed; the cooperation principle refers to the 
nation’s duty to collaborate with other countries to make sure that the international legislation 
properly  addresses  all  issues  of  importance  to  keep  up  safety  and  security  of  nuclear 
enterprises. The principle also means that countries should exchange knowledge in these areas 
to  promote  safety  and  security;  and  that  they  shall  cooperate  to  make  sure  that  nuclear 
materials does not end up in the wrong hands.57 This principle will be further addressed, in the 
section on environmental law.  
Conclusions 
This  section shows that  nuclear  law is  based on a balance of interests;  the dual  focus of 
nuclear  law.  However,  one  can  conclude  that  although  that  nuclear  countries  obviously 
balance  the  benefits  of  nuclear  power  with  its  risks;  not  all  countries  have  come to  the 
conclusion that the risks of nuclear power can be outweighed by its benefits. Hence, what 
creates a problem in the field of international transportation of spent nuclear fuel is that the 
transports expose other nations to a risk which they may have opted out from nationally.  
Next, the safety principle, the security principle and the transparency principles was reviewed. 
The three principles were found to be intertwined, but not necessarily in coherence with one 
another. It was found that the dual usage areas of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear law’s history 
of being a confidential military subject has affected how security has been interpreted. It was 
shown  that  there  are  benefits  to  secrecy;  mainly  that  obscurity  reduces  resistance  from 
external actors. At the same time, the secrecy was found to lead to less legitimacy and the 
chance for internal errors is feared to be larger. Hence, it was seen that a dialogue between the 
shipping/destination states and the concerned coastal states may in fact contribute to increase 
security as well as ameliorate the coastal states legitimate concerns. However,  it  was also 
noted  that  promoting  early  information  does  not  necessarily  lead  to  that  stakeholders’ 
resistance diminish.
Finally it was noted that there are two principles in nuclear law that promote the maintenance 
and development of international cooperation and exchange of information; the principle of 
compliance and the principle of international cooperation. These principles are also found in 
56 Stoiber et al, p 9. 
57 Stoiber et al, p 10-11
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other areas of international law and will be further addressed in the section on environmental 
principles.
2.3. Background to Navigational Rights  
The indivisibility of the oceans
Maritime law is an area of law that is comparatively well regulated on a global level. Many of 
the existing rules are deemed to be close to universal, due to their high level of acceptance. 
Although the UNCLOS is restating the main rules of navigation and the jurisdictional division 
between  flag  and  coastal  states,  these  are  also  considered  to  be  a  part  of  international 
customary law; hence considered to be evocable even towards the few countries that are not 
parties to the convention.58 
The unusually global character of maritime legislation can in a simplified way be explained as 
a consequence of two facts relating to the indivisibility of the oceans. First of all, there is the 
pollution argument. Ships are not stationary; the threat of pollution is therefore not restricted 
to a certain area, as is the case concerning for example nuclear plants. As an example, the 
Barsebäck power plant, situated in the south of Sweden, was a concern mainly for Denmark 
and Sweden. As it  was situated close to the Danish capital;  it  was considered a threat  to 
Denmark. However, as it concerned only Denmark and Sweden, the issue could be resolved 
through bilateral communication. Consider then the case of a shipment of spent nuclear fuel, 
for  example,  from  Japan  to  France.  The  ship  is  then  a  mobile  environmental  hazard59, 
concerning in turn not only Japan or France; but all countries that are transited or whose 
coastlines are passed by, in order to reach the destination. The need for a global legislation is 
then obvious. 
Secondly,  and  perhaps  historically  more  important,  the  global  character  of  maritime 
legislation can be explained as a consequence of convenience. It would be impracticable, not 
to say impossible, for sea captains and their crews to adhere to new rules and demands, every 
time they sailed into a new country.60 To facilitate naval operations, the need for a global 
uniformity in maritime transportations has long been a priority. 
Finally, it shall be noted that the global character of maritime law has also proved to be a 
limitation, when it comes to improving environmental standards. As much as the global rules 
set a global standard to the benefit of the environment and to facilitating naval transports and 
therefore also furthering economic interests;  such a standard is a maximum standard. It is 
difficult to unilaterally raise environmental demands. This is both a consequence of that the 
international  maritime  regime  does  not  encourage  unilateral  measures  as  well  as  that  the 
mobility of ships makes it easy for ship owners to escape such measures by registering their 
vessels under another country’s flag. However, notwithstanding these difficulties, the current 
trend is towards increased environmental control. In the case of oil tankers, for example, the 
international development followed as a consequence of that some countries first decided to 
take unilateral measures.
58 Ringbom, H., Preventing Pollution from Ships – Reflections on the ’Adequacy’ of Existing Rules, Review of 
European Communities & International Environmental Law, Volume 8 Issue 1, 1999, p 21-22.
59 Ringbom, H., p 22.
60 Ringbom, H., p 21.
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Permanency
When the final draft of the UNCLOS was opened to signatures on the 10 th of December 1982 
it put an end to centuries of debates on the issue of who controls the oceans and what rights 
can be claimed by different parties such as coastal states, port states or flag states. However, 
the  principle  of  freedom  of  navigation  on  the  high  seas  and  innocent  passage  through 
territorial waters was already before accepted as a part of international customary law. Or 
rather, there was the “freedom of the seas”-doctrine; reserving narrow coastal waters to the 
control of the coastal states, all the rest of the oceans were perceived to belong to no-one.61 
This doctrine never passed unchallenged, claims to own the sea has during the centuries been 
put forward by a multitude of countries ranging from a decision by  Pope Alexander VI in 
1494 to divide the Atlantic between Portugal and Spain to the early 20’th century’s disputes 
over continental shelves, fishing waters et cetera that triggered the idea of creating a Law of 
the Sea.62 
The disagreements during the creation of the UNCLOS mainly concerned to what distance 
from the coast these areas actually were, as well as how to regulate international straits and 
archipelagic  states.  Hence,  the  problem was not  if  there  should be a  right  to  freedom of 
navigation and innocent passage, but how these rights should be exercised. The UNCLOS 
therefore served partly as a tool for harmonization and partly as a restatement  of already 
accepted principles.63 The result is that the UNCLOS strikes a delicate balance between the 
rights of coastal states and flag states; dividing the right to regulate and control ships between 
them.64 
It can thus be concluded that the principles of freedom of navigation and innocent passage has 
long existed embedded in the “freedom of the seas”-doctrine, but it is worth noting that the 
exact meaning of the principles have varied over centuries of seafaring. Although the current 
interpretation is perceived permanent, it too was initially constructed from a background of 
disparate  opinions.65 This  is  an  aspect  to  remember  when  analyzing  to  what  extent  the 
UNCLOS may and should be adjusted to other evolving interests. A second aspect to consider 
is if it is adaptable to new situations without having to revise the actual convention; in other 
words, does the UNCLOS have a built in flexibility?
Flexibility
The goal when drafting the UNCLOS was to produce “a constitution for the oceans”66. Hence, 
it provides a basic framework of legislation to all maritime affairs; including the transport of 
spent nuclear fuel, to the extent it is not specifically regulated elsewhere. All matters of the 
sea was to be included without infringing on the sovereignty of states and at the same time 
providing  flexibility  preventing  the  legislation  from  becoming  outdated  over  time.67 A 
61 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (a historical perspective), see Section “A historical 
perspective”.
62 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (a historical perspective), see Section “Setting limits”.
63 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (a historical perspective), see Section “A historical 
perspective” and Section “third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea”.
64 The UNCLOS also address other aspects of seafaring, such as fisheries, the seabed and maritime research, et 
cetera. However, these issues are not of direct interest to the subject matter of this thesis and will therefore 
not be further discussed. 
65 This is based on a social constructivist interpretation of the nature of law. For a theoretical background see 
Bladini, Filip, and Glavå, Mats in Gamla och Nya perspektiv på transporträtten, Red.  Svante Johansson, 
Svenska Sjörättsföreningen Skrifter 78, Jure AB 2003
66 ”A Constitution for the Oceans”, Remarks by Tommy T. B. Koh, of Singapore, President of the Third United 
Nations Conference of the Law of the Sea
67 The  Law  of  the  Sea  –  United  Nations  Convention  on  the  Law  of  the  Sea,  Agreement  relating  to  the 
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manifestation of this flexibility is seen in the frequent references to international instruments 
outside of the UNCLOS itself; thus providing for changes in particular areas without the need 
to  revise  the  entire  UNCLOS.  However,  this  possibility  to  provide  changes  shall  not  be 
overestimated, as it usually comes with the qualification that the instrument in question shall 
be  in  accordance  with  the  UNCLOS  or  that  it  is  adopted  by  a  competent  international 
organization;  in most cases,  the IMO.68 However,  an example of how the UNCLOS have 
allowed for increased environmental legislation can be seen in the area of oil tankers. 
Although free navigation and innocent passage combined with flag state rights to legislate 
over  its  registered  fleet  long  presided  over  the  rights  of  coastal  states  to  protect  their 
coastlines, this has gradually changed. Due to that some flag states have lenient legislation or 
lack  of  control  over  the  implementation  of  international  conventions,  some  unseaworthy 
vessels started to fly so-called flags of convenience. This resulted in a few notorious accidents 
involving oil-tankers,  such as  the  Torrey Canyon  off  the Cornwall  coast  in  1967,  Exxon 
Valdez, 1989 in US waters, or recently the Erika in 1999, outside the coast of Brittany. In 
these cases, the coastal states found themselves helpless to the fact that the flag states had not 
done enough to control the safety and standard of their fleet. Hence, the balance of powers 
between coastal states and flag states has been increasingly strained during the recent years.69 
The development has lead towards increasing powers of the coastal states as the governments 
of the countries affected by the disasters imposed stricter environmental legislation. Hence, 
the right to freely sail the oceans has gradually been circumvented to the advantage of coastal 
states. 
It  shall  be  noted  though,  that  the  legislative  changes  when it  comes  to  oil  tankers  were 
possible by the use of port state regulations.70 As the tankers where destined to call certain 
ports; they had to fulfill the standards put up by that particular port. When it comes to oil 
tankers, eventually also the international regulations caught up with the stricter national, US 
and EU legislations, hence again reducing the port/flag/coastal state tension. However, when 
it comes to spent nuclear fuel, such a development is hardly likely, as a nuclear transporting 
ship usually never calls any other ports en route to the port of destination; which in turn has 
provided prior consent, and is thus usually in joint interest with the shipping state.
Conclusions 
Concluding this section, we find that the principles of freedom of navigation and innocent 
passage,  as  they are  expressed  in  the  UNCLOS,  have reached  a  state  of  acceptance  that 
evokes a perceived permanency. With the creation of the UNCLOS the principles meaning 
was disambiguated; resulting in that what used to be a multitude of regional solutions and 
solutions in different  historical  contexts were harmonized into one signification.  This one 
signification is in turn given historical weight, and the concepts of freedom of navigation and 
innocent passage in their final meaning according to UNCLOS is perceived as perennial. This 
means  that  the UNCLOS principles  of  freedom of  navigation  and innocent  passage  have 
become internalised in the international legal system to the extent that their permanence is no 
longer questioned. The fact that the navigational rights are perceived to represent customary 
Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea with Index and excerpts 
from the Final Act of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Division for Ocean Affairs 
and the Law of the Sea, Office of Legal Affairs, United Nations, New York 1997, page 1-2
68 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (a historical perspective), see Section “Protection of 
the Marine Environment”. 
69 Sage, B., Precautionary Coastal States’ Jurisdiction, Ocean Development & International Law, 37:359-387, 
2006, p 361
70 Ringbom, p 23.
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law confirms this standpoint.71 
To say that the principles of freedom of navigation and innocent passage are unquestioned is 
of course an exaggeration, but it illustrates the difference in type between the principles of the 
UNCLOS and some evolving environmental principles, such as the precautionary principle 
that will be introduced next. It shall only be noted here that many claim that environmental 
principles have not yet settled in the sense that they have reached a state of permanency; there 
are still a multitude of principles and ideas, which are introduced into classical areas of law, 
such as the maritime law.72 How to weigh for example the precautionary principle against the 
principle of innocent passage is yet to be determined.
Finally, it is important to keep in mind that when the UNCLOS was created, it was meant to 
be  flexible;  as  to  not  break  under  the  weight  of  time.  Within  the  UNCLOS  there  are 
constructions that are meant to facilitate changes. An example of this is the recent decades 
increase  in  controlling  the  seaworthiness  of  oil-tankers,  as  discussed  above.  However, 
opinions differ on what the size and design of this room for manoeuvre within the UNCLOS 
is.  This topic shall  be returned to in detail below, in Chapter 3 where the articles of the 
UNCLOS are analysed.  
2.4. Background to Environmental Law  
The  purpose  of  this  chapter  is  to  introduce  the  relevant  legal  principles  of  international 
environmental  law  and  their  relation  to  other  areas  of  law.  Obviously,  all  principles  of 
environmental law can not be addressed here; I have chosen a selection of those who may 
have an impact on transboundary transports of spent nuclear fuel. The principles that will be 
discussed more in detail are the principle of State Sovereignty, the principle of cooperation, 
the Preventive Principle and the Precautionary Principle. As shown above, the three first of 
these principles were already mentioned in the introduction to nuclear law. Hence, it shall be 
noted again  that  nuclear  law has  integrated many environmental  aspects  of law.  When it 
comes to the precautionary principle, on the other hand; it is not obvious what status it shall 
be said to have achieved.
However, to begin with, environmental law shall be addressed on a more general level; to 
illustrate  that  there  are  different  kinds  of  principles  that  can  be  actualised  within  the 
environmental field. There is a difference in purpose and level of international acceptance 
between them. Secondly, the above mentioned principles will be introduced and evaluated in 
relation to the transboundary transport of spent nuclear fuel. 
Principles of Environmental Law
The environmental principles that will be discussed in this section can roughly be divided into 
two groups. The principles of cooperation and state sovereignty are both identifying what 
duties  and  rights  that  nations  have  towards  each  other  when  it  comes  to  environmental 
pollution. These are also the more classic principles of environmental law; stemming from 
international customary law and state practice.73  
71 Ringbom, p 22.
72 Theoretical background from Bladini, Filip, and Glavå, Mats in Gamla och Nya perspektiv på transporträtten, 
Red. Svante Johansson, Svenska Sjörättsföreningen Skrifter 78, Jure AB 2003
73 de Sadeleer, N., “Environmental Principles, Modern and Post-modern Law”, Principles of European 
Environmental Law, ed. Macrory, R., Chapter 14, Europa Law Publishing,  2004. 
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The principles of prevention and precaution are both principles relating to how to control and 
assess the risks of a certain measure. The latter can be said to exist within a risk management 
system consisting of three degrees of caution. de Sadeleer calls these three levels the curative 
model, the preventive model and the anticipatory model.74 The curative model corresponds to 
the Polluter  pays  principle and represents the view that  after  damage has been made,  the 
culprit must be responsible for repairing the damage. The preventive principle is a logical step 
towards a heightened preparedness for certain damage. It makes sense that when damage can 
be predicted, it is better to prevent it than to repair it once it has occurred. Especially, as many 
damages may not be repairable, such as the extinction of a certain animal or plant, or the 
destruction of a rain forest. Finally, the anticipatory model is a result of that all damage can 
not be predicted. When damage can not be predicted, the preventive principle is powerless; 
therefore the anticipatory approach suggests the precautionary principle, or in other words, 
that when in doubt, one should refrain from taking a certain measure. Hence, the Polluter 
pays-  ,  the  prevention-  and  the  precaution  principle  stems  from  the  same  idea  of  risk 
management,  however  they operate  at  different  degrees.  Furthermore,  the  principles  exist 
parallel to each other, rather than being evolutionary steps of the same principle; there is no 
restriction to applying them all at once, should that be motivated.75 
As a conclusion, it shall be kept in mind that the environmental principles discussed in the 
following  are  intrinsically  different.  The  state  sovereignty  principle  and  the  principle  of 
cooperation are old, customary rules, in other words, a product of classical international law. 
Also the preventive principle is usually considered to be part of international customary law. 
The  precautionary  and  preventive  principles  are  grounded  directly  upon  care  for  the 
environment, rather than being a product of the nation states sovereignty, as are the other two. 
Thus,  although  the  state  sovereignty  principle  and  the  principle  of  cooperation  are  well 
established; their main purpose is not to protect the environment, but to protect the sovereign 
rights of the nation state. The precautionary principle and the preventive principle on the other 
hand,  may  be  more  suitable  for  environmental  concerns,  since  that  is  what  they  are 
constructed for. But particularly the precautionary principle is not as clearly defined and its 
status in the international community is more insecure. In the following the principles will be 
introduced with focus on how they could be used to increase coastal state control over  en 
route shipments of radioactive materials.
The Principle of State Sovereignty/Obligation not to cause damage76
This principle is expressed in Art 21 and Art 2 Stockholm Declaration.77 It consists of two 
parts, namely the sovereign right of states to exploit their own resources and the duty to make 
sure  that  this  does  not  result  in  transboundary  damage.78 These  rights  and  duties  are 
considered to be international customary law, as illustrated in the ICJ Nuclear Weapons-case, 
section 29:
The existence of the general obligation of States to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and 
control respect the environment of other States or of areas beyond national control is now part of the 
corpus of international law relating to the environment.79 
74 de Sadeleer, N., Environmental Principles – from political slogans to legal rules, pp 15-19.
75 de Sadeleer, N., Environmental Principles – from political slogans to legal rules, p 19.
76 Will hereinafter be referred to as “the sovereignty principle”.
77 Declaration of the United Nations Conference of the Human Environment, Stockholm, 1972.
78 Stockholm Declaration, Art 21.
79 Advisory Opinion of the ICJ on The Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, General List No. 95, 
8 July 1996, section 21.
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Thus,  there  is  a  binding  obligation  not  to  cause  transboundary  harm.  The  definition  of 
environmental harm and what degree of harm or risk that is acceptable is however not clear.80 
In the case of coastal state influence, it is interesting to find whether or not the sovereignty 
principle covers risk of damage, or just executed damage. Secondly, can the obligation not to 
cause damage include a prior consent or at least prior information to the coastal state? Finally, 
one may think of it in the opposite way; as Yemen does in their reservation to the UNCLOS.81 
They reserve the right to demand a prior consent, referring to their state sovereignty according 
to international law; thus they consider themselves to have the right to limit the navigational 
freedom due to this principle.
In the Trail Smelter case, it is stated that no country may cause damage to another over the 
boarder as to cause injury by fumes. However, it was also decided that Canada needed to 
prevent future damage, by implementing a regime of control.82 Thus, in this case it was a 
matter of stopping ongoing contamination (fumes) but also prevent the risk of future damage. 
In the  Lac Lanoux Arbitration83 Spain claimed that a certain measure proposed by France 
could affect  their  environmental  rights and thus,  they argued,  no decision could be taken 
without prior consent from Spain. However, the tribunal decided that no prior consent was 
needed, but that the Spanish interests still should be respected. Presumably the outcome of the 
case was affected by the fact that Spain and France already had an agreement on the issue; 
although Spain claimed that France was in breach. Therefore, it can not be ruled out that in 
another case, the taking into account of another countries right may involve prior consent or at 
least, notification.
Concluding this discussion on the principle of sovereignty and obligation not to cause damage 
to other states, it seems uncertain if it can be used on its own to defend a coastal states ban of 
nuclear vessels, or a demand for information or prior consent. Perhaps in the combination 
with the principle of cooperation, could it be used to further this goal? If there is a duty to not 
cause  transboundary  damage,  and  a  duty  to  cooperate  in  anticipation  of  transboundary 
environmental issues, the combination could be said to include at least a duty to inform a state 
through the waters of which one intends to traverse, carrying radioactive cargo.
The Principle of Cooperation 
Similar to the principle of sovereignty, the principle of cooperation is also expressed in the 
Stockholm Declaration, in principle 24. The principle is widely recognised to have support in 
customary law, concerning hazardous activities.84 The principle evokes quite generally a duty 
for states to cooperate, though the scope of cooperation is described differently depending on 
the situation at hand. However, common denominators seem to be exchange of information, 
notification and consultation when it comes to transboundary issues. 
The principle can also be found in the Lac Lanoux case reviewed above; however, Spain was 
not acknowledged the right to prior consent. This however shall not be seen as decisive, as the 
circumstances in the Lac Lanoux case were specific; consultation had in some sense already 
taken place. 
80 Sands, P., p 241.
81 See Appendix I for excerpts from the list of reservations to the UNCLOS, including Yemen.
82 Trail Smelter case, United States v. Canada, 3 RIAA 1907, 1941.
83 Lac Lanoux Arbitration, Spain v. France, 12 RIAA 285, 1957.
84 Sands, P., p 249.
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The principle of cooperation was also an issue in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project case85, 
where the parties where ordered to cooperate through meaningful negotiations.86 However, 
what this cooperation actually should consist of was not further specified.87 As will be seen 
below, the principle of cooperation is also central to the MOX plant case. Finally, both these 
cases  also  address  the  preventive principle,  thus  judging from the  discussion so far,  it  is 
difficult to separate the environmental principles as one often invokes another.  
The Preventive Principle  
The principle of prevention is also considered to be a part of international customary law; it 
has been confirmed in the  Trail smelter case as well as in the  MOX plant case and in the 
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros  Project case,  all  discussed  above.  The  meaning  of  the  preventive 
principle is to prevent damages that can be foreseen. 
Thus,  it  is  related  to  the  sovereignty  principle,  but  differs,  as  was  reflected  upon in  the 
introduction to this section, from the latter since it is not a consequence of state sovereignty 
but of environmental concerns. Thus it has a wider scope than the sovereignty principle; it 
does not only prescribe that a county shall  not engage in transboundary pollution,  it  also 
demands that pollution within the national boundaries must be prevented.88 
However, the preventive principle only prescribes that damage that can be foreseen shall be 
prevented. To what extent this shall be done is unclear. For example, the damages caused by a 
nuclear accident are considered to be grave. But at the same time, chances that an incident 
occurs are small,  though not  negligible.  Thus,  there is  an element  of uncertainty when it 
comes to ascertaining the risk. Furthermore, different countries may understand the graveness 
of  a  threat  in  different  ways.  This  indicates  that  information  and  consultation  between 
concerned countries may contribute to determine to what degree preventive action must be 
taken. One of the reasonable steps of prevention may actually be to inform other states, to 
allow them to take safety measures of their own, and thus increasing security.
The element of uncertainty is sometimes said to be characteristic for the twenty-first century 
society, a world of global risk.89 However, the fact that a risk is not scientifically ascertainable 
does not necessarily mean that it is a problem that can be postponed into the future. Locating 
a terminal storage for nuclear fuel and preventing global warming are issues that most people 
find  important,  although it  is  uncertain  to  what  extent  current  and future generations  are 
affected.  Similarly,  the  consequences  of  genetically  modified  foodstuffs  are  yet  to  be 
determined. Applying the preventive principle, one may reach the conclusion that these issues 
do not entail damages that can be anticipated and thus, the principle is not applicable. Concern 
over this has induced the precautionary principle, which will be discussed next. 
The Precautionary Principle  
The purpose of the precautionary approach is to ameliorate the problem of countries choosing 
not to act in protection of the environment with reference to lack of scientific certainty or in 
trust  of  the  environments  ability  to  regenerate  itself.  Thus,  the  difference  between  the 
prevention  and  the  precaution  principle  is  the  certainty  of  risk.  The  preventive  principle 
operates  with  measurable  scientific  certainties;  the  precautionary  principle  is  preoccupied 
85 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgement I.C.J. Reports 1997, p 7.
86 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgement I.C.J. Reports 1997, p 7, p 83.
87 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgement I.C.J. Reports 1997, p 7, p 78.
88 de Sadeleer, N., Environmental Principles – from political slogans to legal rules, p 64 and Sands, P., p 246.
89 Mason, M., p 1-2.
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with uncertain risks, or suspected risks, not yet proven beyond a doubt.90
A definition  of  the  precautionary  principle  that  is  often  cited  is  Principle  15  of  the  Rio 
Declaration:
In  order  to  protect  the  environment,  the  precautionary  approach  shall  be  widely  applied  by  States  
according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full  
scientific  certainty shall  not  be  used as  a  reason  for  postponing  cost-effective  measures  to  prevent  
environmental degradation.91 
 
This definition is quite vague and the principle has accordingly been interpreted in a range of 
different ways; on one hand, it is claimed to shift the burden of proof on to the active party, to 
prove that the suggested actions are not endangering the environment. On the other side of the 
scale, for example Sunstein, suggest that the precautionary principle shall be interpreted as an 
“Anti-Catastrophe Principle”; in other words, the maximin principle.92
Since a decision in accordance with the precautionary principle,  without  certain scientific 
proof may prove to be both costly and faulty, the application of the precautionary principle is 
controversial; while some find that it has  “become a full-fledged and general principle of  
international law”93, others find that it is a trade protectionist measure at best.94 Sunstein draw 
a  parallel  to  the  war  in  Iraq;  described  as  a  pre-emptive  measure  and  claim  that  the 
precautionary principle, in its extensive interpretation is little more than a pre-emptive strike.95 
As a contrast to this sceptical approach, the precautionary principle is implemented in Art 
174.2 EC Treaty and shall serve as a base for all the commissions’ activities.
It  is  therefore not quite clear  what the precautionary principle entails  in respect  of actual 
obligations. In the narrowest interpretation it concludes that the extent of the precautionary 
measures increase, the bigger and more devastating a potential  risk is deemed to be. This 
implies that to gain a reasonable knowledge of the risk is mandatory, otherwise it is hard to 
know what precautionary measures that are suitable. Hence, in the basic interpretation of the 
precautionary  principle,  there  seem  to  be  a  demand  for  environmental  research  and 
evaluation. 
Van  Dyke  claims  that  the  precautionary  principle  among  other  things  demands  an 
environmental impact assessment and the notification and consultation of concerned parties.96 
According to the Commission, the precautionary principle within the EC may entail reversing 
the burden of proof, but not in all  situations.97 Furthermore, its application within the EC 
includes taking into account the principles of proportionality, non-discrimination, consistency 
and examination of the benefits and costs of action or lack of action; although in the latter 
case public health shall always be prioritised over economic advantages. Thus, it seems like 
the precautionary principles is a widely defined term; its contents seemingly adjustable to the 
situation. This is an interpretation in line with  de Sadeleer’s  opinion that the precautionary 
90 de Sadeleer, N., Environmental Principles – from political slogans to legal rules, p 75 and 91.
91 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 1992, Principle 15.
92 Sunstein, C. R., Laws of Fear – Beyond the Precautionary Principle, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p 
109.
93 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION on the precautionary principle, COM/2000/0001, Ch 4. 
94 See the U.S. opinions in WTO DS26: EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones)
95 Sunstein, C. R., p 4.
96 Van Dyke, J. M., “Applying the precautionary principle to Ocean Shipments of Radioactive Materials” 38 
Ocean Dev. & Int’l L. p 379, 1996.
97 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION on the precautionary principle, COM/2000/0001, Ch 6.4.
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principle is, in his words, a post-modern legal rule and thus a directing principle to be used as 
a pair of coloured glasses to interpret other legislation, rather than being a general principle 
deducted from case law, with an exact content.98  
Hence,  it  seems reasonable to look further  into how the precautionary principle  has been 
interpreted specifically in relation to marine transportation. It has, as a matter of fact, also to a 
great extent been applied in the field of marine pollution.99 Thus, it is perhaps not strange that 
it is frequently mentioned in the case of transboundary shipments of spent nuclear waste. The 
relationship between the UNCLOS and the precautionary principle is specifically addressed in 
the objectives of Chapter 17.22 Agenda 21:
States, in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on  
protection and preservation of the marine environment,  commit themselves, in accordance with their  
policies, priorities and resources, to prevent, reduce and control degradation of the marine environment so 
as to maintain and improve its life-support and productive capacities. To this end, it is necessary to:
a. Apply preventive, precautionary and anticipatory approaches so as to avoid degradation of the marine 
environment, as well as to reduce the risk of long-term or irreversible adverse effects upon it;100
Again, we find a very broad description of the precautionary principle; although the Agenda 
21 is no binding document of law, this is an indication on in what direction the international 
community wish the legal development to move.
The precautionary principle was, although not explicitly mentioned, one of the issues in the 
Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases101.  In the cases New Zealand and Australia are concerned that 
Japan has breached against its obligations according to the UNCLOS by using experimental 
methods in fishing tuna. The Japanese main defence is that there is no scientific evidence that 
indicates that their method is bad. However, the order was in favour of the claimants. It is 
furthermore stated in Judge ad hoc  Shearers separate opinion that  “The Tribunal  has not  
found  it  necessary  to  enter  into  a  discussion  of  the  precautionary  principle/approach.  
However,  I  believe  that  the  measures  ordered  by  the  Tribunal  are  rightly  based  upon  
considerations deriving from a precautionary approach”.102 
A similar  approach is  taken by Judge  ad hoc Székely, in the MOX plant case,  where he 
concludes  that  he  “fully  share  the  same  opinion  regarding  the  Tribunal’s  alternative  
provisional measures that it ordered in this case”, referring to the above cited opinion by 
Judge ad hoc Shearer.103 
It shall also be added that both the  MOX plant case and the  Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases  
ordered that the parties should cooperate and thus share information to work out a common 
solution. Whether or not this stems from the principle of cooperation is not that important; it 
is naturally possible to apply more than one principle to support a case.  However,  as the 
precautionary principle seems to have been silently applied in the above cases, in combination 
98 de Sadeleer, N., “Environmental Principles, Modern and Post-modern Law”, Principles of European 
Environmental Law, ed. Macrory, R., Chapter 14, Europa Law Publishing,  2004, Section 4.3. 
99 de Sadeleer, N., Environmental Principles – from political slogans to legal rules, p 94.
100Agenda 21 - Global Programme of Action on Sustainable Development, UNCED, 1992.
101 Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (Australia v. Japan; New Zealand v. Japan), Provisional Measures, Cases No. 
3 and 4, ITLOS.
102 Separate opinion of Judge ad hoc Shearer, Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (Australia v. Japan; New Zealand v. 
Japan), Provisional Measures, Cases No. 3 and 4, ITLOS. 
103 Separate opinion of Judge ad hoc Székely, the MOX Plant Case (Ireland v. United Kingdom) Accessible on 
http://www.itlos.org/cgi-bin/cases/case_detail.pl?id=10&lang=en#order
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with Art 17.22 Agenda 21, it seems like the precautionary principle may have earned a place 
as a tool of interpretation when assessing the articles of the UNCLOS.
Concluding this section on the precautionary principle, it has been found that the extent of this 
principle is quite uncertain. It enjoys a special status within the EC; but in the international 
community  it  can  not  be  said  to  have  reached  the  status  of  a  customary  law.  It  is  also 
uncertain what scope the principle has, something that is different depending on the area of 
use.  However,  taken to mean a reversed burden of proof;  the principle  demands that  the 
shipper of nuclear materials prove to all en route coastal states that they have taken sufficient 
measures of precaution.
It has also been taken into account, although not expressly, when construing the rights and 
obligations  provided for  by the UNCLOS. Thus,  it  is  possible  that  it  may be used as an 
argument by concerned coastal states, to demand increased influence on shipments of spent 
nuclear fuel. 
2.5 General conclusions on principles concerning naval transport of nuclear materials
After reviewing the principles in nuclear law, environmental law and maritime law that may 
affect en route countries right to influence, it seems that on a principal level, maritime law is 
the largest obstacle; or more specifically, the principles concerning freedom of navigation and 
innocent  passage.  Nuclear  law,  although  historically  favouring  confidentiality,  is  mainly 
concerned with ensuring that transports are safe and secure, whilst taking into account that a 
certain degree of risks are acceptable, as long as it is connected to a corresponding benefit. 
Environmental  law may provide some support  to the  en route  countries.  The principle of 
cooperation,  sovereignty  and  prevention  are  all  considered  to  be  general  principles  of 
international law. It is not impossible that a combination of these principles may give coastal 
states a right to information and perhaps even prior informed consent. It is still difficult to 
motivate  a  total  ban,  however.  Similarly,  the  precautionary  principle  may  provide  some 
guidance when construing the UNCLOS; however at the same time, it must be remembered 
that it is enjoying a different status within the EU than in international law. 
The principles of innocent passage and free navigation are likely to oppose any demand from 
a coastal country that they need prior information on a certain transport, or that they ban some 
or all transports carrying spent nuclear fuel. At the same time, we have concluded that the 
UNCLOS has a certain built  in flexibility.  The degree of flexibility is however uncertain. 
Perhaps the UNCLOS can be bent to fit together with the above discussed environmental 
principles, thus providing coastal states with a right to influence within the existing matrix of 
international maritime law. Thus, the next chapter begin with a review of what legislation that 
controls transboundary transports of spent nuclear fuel in the UNCLOS. 
30
3. LEGISLATION APPLIED AND CASE LAW ANALYSIS
3.1. Introduction
After  reviewing  what  principles  of  law  that  may  be  evoked  by  the  question  of  what 
possibilities that an en route coastal state has to be informed about, and influence on, a certain 
shipment of spent nuclear fuel; it is now time to pursue the actual legislation. The previous 
chapter has hopefully served to provide the reader both with a motivation to why a coastal 
state may want to have information and control over shipments of spent nuclear fuel, as well 
as with a general sense of where problems are likely to arise, on a principal level. The purpose 
of this chapter is to find the law in force; but also on a wider scale, to find out how the 
different principles of the previous chapter has been balanced against each other and if the 
current legislation allows a shift in this balance.
The previous chapter ended with concluding that the UNCLOS is likely to provide the biggest 
obstacles  to  increased  coastal  state  control.  Therefore,  this  investigation  will  start  with 
reviewing what possibilities the UNCLOS leaves for coastal states to demand information or 
influence over a certain shipment. 
As was noted in the introduction, the investigation is delimited to investigating coastal states 
rights in relation to four possible degrees of control;  an unconditional ban, prior informed 
consent, prior information and no information. These degrees of control will all be examined 
in relation to how far from the coast line the shipment is scheduled; the territorial waters, the 
EEZ and the adjacent high seas. A conclusion will be reached on to what degree a coastal 
state can influence a shipment, and to what degree this right to influence is decreased as the 
distance to the en route states coast line increases.
3.2. UNCLOS revisited
Finding the applicable legislation to answer the above question begins with revisiting the 
UNCLOS. What legislation concerns the coastal states? What rights do they have, in general, 
to  receive information  about,  to  ban or  to  control  vessels  in  their  waters?  Are there  any 
exceptions for nuclear cargo? Can environmental concerns expand coastal states rights? The 
following  section  will  analyse  the  articles  of  the  UNCLOS to  find  what  legislation  that 
concerns  coastal  states  and how the  rights  differ,  depending on if  a  transport  is  destined 
through the territorial waters, the EEZ or through the adjacent high seas of a coastal state. 
The Territorial Waters – non-innocent passage
A coastal states national sovereignty extends beyond its boarders a maximum of 12 nautical 
miles from its baseline.104 The word sovereignty suggests that the coastal state therefore has 
the same control over the territorial waters as it has over national terra firma. However, as 
have been indicated above, the sovereignty is limited;105 the principle of innocent passage 
supersedes that of national sovereignty.106 Of interest  in this case are the general  rules of 
innocent passage, applicable to all vessels, and the specific rule concerning ships carrying 
104 Art 2 and 3 UNCLOS
105 Art 2 pt 3 UNCLOS
106 Section 3 UNCLOS
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nuclear materials.107 
If a vessel can be defined as non-innocent; a coastal state is entitled to “take the necessary 
steps” to prevent its passage.108 Thus, should a ship carrying spent nuclear fuel be defined as 
non-innocent  are  all  of  the  above  suggested  requirements;  an  unconditional  ban,  prior 
informed consent or prior information in accordance with the UNCLOS.
First of all, can a ship carrying spent nuclear fuel can be considered innocent? According to 
Art 19 UNCLOS; a passage is innocent as long as it is not “prejudicial to the peace, good 
order  or  security” of  a  coastal  state.  To find out  what  constitutes  such prejudice Art  19 
UNCLOS proceeds with a list giving examples of such situations. Out of these, none are  a 
priori  matching the case of transport of spent nuclear fuel. Art 19.2 (h) UNCLOS refers to 
any  act  of wilful and serious pollution. Although, in the case of transporting spent nuclear 
fuel, there is an obvious risk for serious pollution, for this article to be applicable the damage 
must already have taken place. Furthermore, even if a ship in a situation of hardship causes 
pollution, it is still to be considered innocent, as long as the pollution was not wilful. Finally, 
Art 19.2 (l) refers to any other activity; in other words, there is a demand of positive action, 
the mere threat of an incident is not enough to declare a ship non-innocent. 
Hence,  the  possibilities  to  declare  a  ship  carrying  spent  nuclear  fuel  as  non-innocent 
according to the list in Art 19.2 UNCLOS are close to non-existent. However, as noted above, 
the list is not to be considered exhaustive, and hence it is also possible to fall back on the 
initial definition of a non-innocent passage; that it is not “prejudicial to the peace, good order  
or  security”  of  a  coastal  state.  Clearly,  this  broad  statement  provides  more  room  for 
manoeuvre, than the more specific wordings in Art 19.2. 
However,  it  is  not  free  for  a  coastal  state  to  arbitrarily  decide  whether  or  not  a  certain 
manoeuvre is to be considered as non-innocent. According to the Corfu Channel case109 the 
assessment of whether or not a passage shall be considered innocent is objective; the opinion 
of the coastal state alone can not render a certain passage innocent or non-innocent.110 This is 
also supported by the fact that the enumeration was not originally in the 1958 convention,111 
but added after proposals from several countries, wishing to specify the term innocence, and 
circumvent possible coastal state arbitrariness in interpretation.112 
As a conclusion, although the enumeration in Art 19.2 UNCLOS is not exhaustive, the fact 
that ships innocence shall be determined objectively indicates that the wording “prejudicial to  
the peace, good order or security” shall be interpreted in a strict sense. It is possible to argue 
that  the risks  connected with a  transport  of spent  nuclear  fuel  are  threatening the coastal 
state’s security. However, there is also a special regulation concerning ships carrying nuclear 
materials, Art 23 UNCLOS. Although this article is not concerned with defining innocent and 
non-innocent passage, we find that it is undoubtedly possible for a vessel carrying nuclear 
cargo to sail innocently. Thus, for a ship to be determined as non-innocent, presumably it 
must at least deviate from the specific demands articulated in Art 23 UNCLOS; something 
that most shipments are unlikely to do. Therefore it is not likely that a transport of spent 
107 Art 23 UNCLOS
108 Art 25.1 UNCLOS
109 Corfu Channel case, Judgment of April 9th, 1949, I.C. J. Reports 1949, p. 4, at p 30.
110 Cassese, International Law, Second Edition, Oxford University Press, Hampshire, 2005, p 85.
111 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, 1958 
112 Ghosh, S.,”The legal regime of innocent passage through the territorial sea”, Law of the Sea, ed. Hugo 
Caminos, Ashgate/Dartmouth, 2001, p 58.
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nuclear  fuel  shall  be considered as  non-innocent  according to the UNCLOS.  However,  a 
coastal state also has a right to control the innocent passage to a certain extent; which will be 
addressed next.
The Territorial Waters – innocent passage
If the shipment of spent nuclear fuel is assessed to be innocent, as is most likely the case, the 
passage can still be regulated by the coastal state to some extent. This does obviously not 
include an unconditional ban of transports of spent nuclear fuel, but perhaps demanding prior 
informed consent or prior information can be justified? 
According to Art 21 UNCLOS, a coastal state may legislate on a number of issues; of interest 
in this case is (a), (d) and (f) concerning safety of navigation, conservation of living resources 
and preservation of the environment, including pollution control. However, this opportunity to 
legislate is limited in a few respects. First of all, they may not concern the vessels design, 
construction, manning or equipment. This may possibly provide an obstacle, should a country 
wish  to  demand  higher  security  standards  than  what  is  provided  for  in  international 
legislation. However, as will be seen below, in respect of design, construction, manning and 
equipment; international regulations are extensive. 
Secondly, any legislation adopted by the coastal state must not have the practical effect of 
denying  or  impairing  the  right  of  innocent  passage  or  discriminate  against  a  particular 
nationality.113 Demanding  a  prior  informed  consent  is  hence  not  in  accordance  with  this 
article,  as  it  would,  should  consent  not  be  given;  impair  the  right  of  innocent  passage. 
Demanding a  prior  notification,  on the other  hand,  does  not  impair  the right  of  innocent 
passage; as the coastal state in that case have no right to object to the transport, although they 
are  entitled  to  receive  knowledge  about  it.  At  the  same  time,  the  procedure  of  prior 
notification was suggested and rejected during drafting of the UNCLOS.114 However, even if 
the prior notification did not explicitly make it into the UNCLOS, it is not excluded either. 
The fact that it was left outside is certainly not equal to banning such practice. 
Moreover, apart from being able to demand prior information from vessels carrying nuclear 
fuel, the UNCLOS gives the coastal states right to prescribe sea lanes that the vessels are 
obliged to conform with.115 In combination with a demand on prior information, this provides 
an instrument for coastal states to exclude heavy traffic routes or areas otherwise implying 
particular risks. However, as stated above; only to an extent that does not deny or impair the 
right of innocent passage.
Finally, ships carrying nuclear materials are obliged to carry documents and observe measures 
prescribed in international agreements.116 What international agreements that are the target of 
this wording will be considered later.117 The fact that they are obliged to carry documents 
implies that the coastal states are entitled to check them.118 Enforcement is otherwise regulated 
in Art 27 and 220 UNCLOS and usually demands a high degree of suspicion of that the vessel 
has acted in violation of an international or a national rule. However, the wording in Art 86 
indicates that there is an information duty to the coastal state, if not prior to departure, so at 
least when the ship is traversing the coastal states territorial waters.
113 Art 24 and Art 211.4 UNCLOS
114 Ghosh, S., p 60-61
115 Art 22 UNCLOS
116 Art 23 UNCLOS 
117 See below, section “International Agreements and Competent International Organizations in the UNCLOS”.
118 Ghosh, S., p 61. 
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The Territorial waters – Conclusions
If the coastal state can prove that a vessel carrying spent nuclear fuel is non-innocent, it is 
possible  to ban the ship from its  waters,  demand prior informed consent  or request  prior 
information. However, in most cases, the hazardous nature of the cargo as such does not make 
the shipment non-innocent. In that case, the coastal state may still demand prior information, 
advise the ship of certain sea lanes and review the documents that the vessel is obliged to 
carry. Furthermore, ships carrying nuclear materials are obliged to observe standards set forth 
in  international  agreements.  This  internalises  several  international  agreements  into  the 
UNCLOS that  also  shall  have  to  be  taken into  account.  Such a  reference  to  instruments 
outside  of  the  UNCLOS  is  not  unusual,  although  not  uniformly  formulated.  UNCLOS 
references to external material is discussed below, in a separate section.119 
The High Seas
The high seas are defined as the areas not  being the EEZ, territorial  waters or any other 
special zone discussed in the UNCLOS.120 The high seas are  res communis omnium,  they 
belong to everyone; the freedom of navigation is unlimited. No state may claim sovereignty 
over the high seas.121 The right to intercept a vessel flying a foreign flag on the high seas is 
limited to a few cases including slave trading, piracy and illegal broadcasting.122 Otherwise, a 
vessels flag state is responsible for ensuring that sufficient safety and security standards are 
maintained. A coastal state hence has a very limited control over ships travelling the high 
seas. This does not mean that the high seas are unregulated, but that the right/duty to legislate 
falls entirely on the flag state; the coastal state may only influence such regulations indirectly 
through the relevant international organs. As a conclusion, a coastal state can not demand 
prior notification, prior informed consent or ban vessels travelling in their adjacent high seas. 
The Exclusive Economic Zone
The EEZ is the area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea; it extends up to 200 nautical 
miles123 from the baselines from which the territorial sea was measured.124 The EEZ is, similar 
to the high seas, subject to the freedom of navigation; Art 58 UNCLOS which defines the 
freedom of navigation in the EEZ also refers to the corresponding article concerning the high 
seas. However, the legal status of the EEZ is different from both the territorial waters and the 
high seas. It is neither a zone of national jurisdiction nor res communis omnium; rather, it is to 
be considered a zone sui generis.125
Therefore, the coastal states have some sovereign rights that are connected specifically with 
the EEZs. Of relevance to this thesis is mainly 56.1 (b) (iii), which provides that the coastal 
state  has  jurisdictional  right  concerning  the  preservation  and  protection  of  the  marine 
environment. Furthermore, in 56.1 (a) it is stated that a coastal state has the sovereign right to 
conserve and manage natural resources; however, this is mainly concerned with how fishing 
and extraction of resources from the seabed should be administered, accordingly this thesis 
119 See below, section “International Agreements and Competent International Organizations in the UNCLOS”.
120 Art 86 UNCLOS
121 Art 89 UNCLOS 
122 Art 110 UNCLOS
123 The figure 200 miles emanates from that Peru thought that this was the width of the Humboldt current; an 
area with particularly good fishing  adjacent to Peru’s coastline, wishing to keep these waters under Peruvian 
control.  See  Koh,  T.  B.  T.,”The  Exclusive  Economic  Zone”,  Law  of  the  Sea,  ed.  Hugo  Caminos, 
Ashgate/Dartmouth, 2001, p 163.
124 Art 55 and 57 UNCLOS
125 Koh, T. B. T.,”The Exclusive Economic Zone”, p 185-186.
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will focus on 56.1 (b) (iii). Also, note that when coastal states exercise their rights according 
to these articles; they are limited to act in accordance with the convention and taking into 
account the rights and duties of other states.126 
When  exercising  their  jurisdictional  right  concerning  preservation  and  protection  of  the 
marine environment, coastal states are not free to take any precautions they like. The freedom 
of legislation that the coastal states enjoy is specified in Part XII of the UNCLOS.127 To the 
extent that the UNCLOS does not provide for a clear division of rights concerning a specific 
issue, residual rights does not automatically belong to the coastal states. In these cases, the 
question must be analysed and solved equitable and weighing in all interests of the parties of 
the conflict, but also of the international community as a whole.128 In other words, residual 
rights must be judged on a case-to-case basis; a consequence of the EEZs hybrid character as 
being neither under national jurisdiction nor completely devoid of national character.129 
Exclusive Economic Zones and Marine Pollution according to Part XII UNCLOS
In order to find out to what extent a coastal state may demand prior information or consent, or 
issue a complete ban, it is necessary to first analyse the content of Part XII UNCLOS. To the 
extent the question is not covered by this section, it shall be considered a residual right, and be 
assessed according to the above described procedure.
Initially,  there  is  a  general  obligation  on  all  states  to  protect  and  preserve  the  marine 
environment; this naturally includes not only coastal states but also flag states.130 Furthermore, 
they are obliged to take “all measures [...] necessary” to prevent pollution as long as it does 
not  result  in  an  “unjustified  interference”  with  other  states  rights  according  to  the 
convention.131  However, this shall not be interpreted as that the coastal states always has an 
overarching duty to prevent pollution; sometimes this duty befalls on the flag states. Part XII 
UNCLOS  is  in  fact  mostly  concerned  with  dividing  the  responsibility  of  environmental 
protection between coastal and flag states; sometimes, the flag states are obliged to attend a 
minimum standard, sometimes the coastal states are only allowed to set a standard to a certain 
maximum level. 
Art 197 UNCLOS incorporates the cooperation principle, stating that countries are obliged to 
co-operate in “formulating and elaborating international rules, standards and recommended 
practices  and procedures consistent  with this  Convention”  in  order  to  protect  the marine 
environment.  Both  international  and  regional  cooperation  is  encouraged,  whilst  as  a 
consequence, unilateral manoeuvres seems to be ruled out. Thus, Art 197 UNCLOS does not 
promote  the  cooperation  principle  in  a  wider  sense;  demanding  that  states  bilaterally 
cooperates  on  a  case-to-case  basis  by  for  example  providing  each  other  with  prior 
information. It is merely an encouragement to states to take joint action outside the UNCLOS, 
to  improve  the  environmental  legislation  that  the  UNCLOS  incorporates,  for  example, 
through Art 211 UNCLOS. 
According to Art 211.5 UNCLOS, a coastal state may in its EEZ adopt regulations or laws 
“conforming to and giving effect  to generally  accepted international  rules and standards  
established  through  the  competent  international  organization  or  general  diplomatic  
126 Art 56.2 UNCLOS
127 Koh, T. B. T.,”The Exclusive Economic Zone”, p 164.
128 Art 59 UNCLOS
129 Koh, T. B. T.,”The Exclusive Economic Zone”, p 187.
130 Art 192 UNCLOS
131 Art 194 UNCLOS
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conference.”  This  is  one  of  the  built  in  flexibilities  of  the  UNCLOS;  the  level  of 
environmental  protection is  not  directly  defined in the text  of the treaty.  Instead the text 
contains  a  reference  to  “generally  accepted  international  rules  and  standards” and 
“competent  international  organizations  or  general  diplomatic  conference”.  These 
formulations are similar to the ones used in Art 23 UNCLOS, as cited above. To find out what 
legislation that a coastal state may adopt, a definition of the meaning of these phrasings is 
necessary. However, initially we may conclude that coastal states can not unilaterally impose 
any legislation in their EEZ that does not correspond to rules and standards accepted by the 
appropriate  international  forum.  It  is  important  to  note  that  in  the  case  of  coastal  state 
influence on vessels in their EEZ, the international agreements constitute a maximum level of 
protection.  Flag  states  on  the  other  hand  must  implement  international  legislation  as  a 
minimum requirement. They are free to conjure harsher legislation on vessels flying their flag, 
should they wish to do so. 
International Agreements and Competent International Organizations in the UNCLOS
As seen in the above review of coastal states possibilities to influence on a transport of spent 
nuclear fuel, there are continuously references to international agreements, standards or rules 
as well as to competent international authorities and such.132 However, this terminology is not 
consequent through the treaty and it  is not clear from the text what agreements and what 
organizations that it is actually referring to. This question is of great importance; as we have 
seen, possibilities to influence the freedom of navigation or the innocent passage are very 
small, judging only from what can be a priori deducted from the text of the UNCLOS.  
Unfortunately, there is no easy solution to this question. It is acknowledged to be difficult by 
some authors133, while others choose to promote one solution without reference to the intrinsic 
problem of definition.134 In the following, we shall first of all try to solve the issue of the 
“competent international authority” as used in Art 211.5 UNCLOS and secondly, we shall try 
to find the international agreements that are addressed in Art 23 UNCLOS.
 
Article 211.5 UNCLOS
When it comes to Art 211.5 UNCLOS, there are three separate issues. First of all, who is the 
competent authority? Secondly, is there a difference between a “rule” and a “standard”? And 
finally, what level of acceptance is “generally accepted” in practice?
The competent international organization in 211.5 is according to the Law of the Sea Bulletin 
referring to the IMO.135 However, in the same article we find that the list provided is only 
advisory; it is possible that other organizations will be considered competent in the future, and 
it  is  also  possible  that  organizations  not  mentioned  in  the  tables  are  to  be  considered 
competent  on an advisory level or through a mandate from an organization named in the 
table.136 As a conclusion so far, this means that the UNCLOS is truly flexible. It is designed to 
bend  with  environmental  trends,  allowing  current  issues  be  incorporated  as  parts  of  the 
UNCLOS itself, as long as they have reached a certain state of acceptance. 
132 Examples of such wordings can be found in Art 23 and Art 211 UNCLOS to mention a few. 
133 See for example, Boyle, A. E., “Marine Pollution Under the Law of the Sea Convention”, Law of the Sea, 
ed. Hugo Caminos, Ashgate/Dartmouth, 2001, p 382-383 and Louka, E., p 147.
134 See for example Dixon, D. B., p 27, Sage, B., p 368.  
135 “Competent and Relevant International Organizations under the United Nations Convention of the Law of 
the Sea”, Law of the Sea Bulletin, no 31, p 79-95, 1996, p 87.
136 “Competent and Relevant International Organizations under the United Nations Convention of the Law of 
the Sea, p 79.
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Boyle suggests that in weighing between a strict or a wide interpretation of what international 
rules or standards that should be taken into account as “generally accepted”, one should keep 
in mind the purpose of the UNCLOS; in many cases to fill an obligation to regulate with 
content, but in the case of coastal state legislation; to limit their possibilities to unduly hamper 
the right of navigation of other states.137 Thus, it is motivated with a slightly more cautious or 
narrow interpretation in the cases where the UNCLOS provides a maximum standard; a wider 
interpretation should be employed when the convention suggests a minimum level.   
In defining what is “generally accepted”, the interpretation ranges from that it is a rule that 
enjoys ratification and implementation in many national laws; or that a rule is considered to 
be customary law; or that it is enough that the rule has been negotiated in an international 
arena and is ratified by enough countries to make it enter into force.138 There are problems 
contained  in  each  of  these  approaches;  demanding  near-global  ratification  or  a  status  as 
customary law would render the rule tooth-less in practice, as it would only point towards 
such rules that are so commonly accepted that they need not be referred to. On the other hand, 
employing  the  latter  view could  interfere  with  the  national  sovereignty  of  countries  that 
deliberately have chosen not to ratify a certain convention, and that then would be forced to 
conform to this view contrary to its conviction. On the other hand, as these rules would be 
implemented only in the coastal waters of foreign countries, the sovereignty on a countries 
national territory will not be affected. They are free to employ less strict environmental rules 
in their own waters since, as shown above; the coastal state legislation in the EEZs are stating 
a maximum and not a minimum level. Thus, it seems quite equitable to me that a coastal state 
may legislate using the interpretation that “generally accepted” shall be interpreted as “ratified 
by enough countries to enter into force”.
Finally there is the distinction between “standards” and “rules”. This division could indicate 
that  whereas  “rules”  are  referring to  binding legislation,  “standards”  could  refer  to  mere 
recommendations not intended to have binding force.  Boyle argues that “standards” simply 
indicates  a  different  kind of  binding  obligation,  as  he  defends  the  states  right  to  “make 
collective recommendation without their becoming instantly and indirectly a form of binding  
obligation.”139 However, in my opinion,  Boyle neglects that recommendations by no means 
instantly turns into international law, should they be covered by the term “standards” in Art 
211.5 UNCLOS. For a “standard” to become a legal rule according to this article, it must be 
both  “generally  accepted”  and  be  created  by  the  “relevant  international  organisation”. 
Furthermore, a coastal state must implement it into its own legislation; otherwise it has no 
binding effect. 
The purpose of issuing recommendations,  for example in the IMO, is that companies and 
countries shall follow these. The fact that a recommendation is not formulated as hard law 
may have several reasons; perhaps it is considered to be more effective hoping that a certain 
industry with strong groups of interest will regulate themselves rather than through the use of 
force. Perhaps there are one or a few parties that continuously object to a binding legislation. 
However, employing the same line of argument as above, all countries are free to keep the 
lenient legislation outside their own coast lines, should they wish to do so. It does not actually 
influence their state sovereignty, should other coastal states choose to implement a certain 
“standard” as a binding obligation in its EEZ. As noted before, the EEZ is different from the 
high seas in that it is not res communis omnium.
137 Boyle, A. E., p 382.
138 Boyle, A. E., p 382.
139 Boyle, A. E., p 383.
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Concluding the discussion on Art 211.5 UNCLOS, it has been shown that the IMO is the 
main competent organisation; however this is not to be considered an absolute truth, but rather 
a current state, subject to change. Secondly, it has been concluded that “generally accepted” 
should be taken to mean that it is negotiated on the international level and that it has entered 
into force. Finally, I argue that rules and standards are not two names of the same thing, but 
rather that also non-binding documents can be considered under Art 211.5; as long as they 
also fulfil the other criteria stated in the article. 
Article 23 UNCLOS
Initially  when  discussing  Art  23  UNCLOS,  it  shall  be  noted  that  it  does  not  contain  a 
reference  to  an  international  organ;  it  simply  states  that  the  vessel  shall  observe  special 
precautionary measures, as established through “international agreements”. Does this mean 
that an international agreement concluded through any authority on this subject is relevant 
according to Art 23 UNCLOS? This is not impossible, however, according to the Law of the 
Sea Bulletin, a certain international organisation may be considered as competent, although 
not  being  specifically  referred  to;  when  formulations  such  as   “international  rules  and 
standards” or similar, are being used.140 However, what international organ is competent in 
this area? As the article is specifically concerned with vessels carrying nuclear cargo, it is 
likely that the IAEA is the main competent organ.141 However, it seems possible that both the 
IMO and regional organs, such as the EURATOM-agreement may be relevant, as long as they 
are of reasonably international or regional character. What particular regulations or codes that 
may be significant will be discussed in the section that concerns nuclear transport regulation 
outside of the UNCLOS.
Special Remarks concerning a ban on Nuclear Transports and Art 195 UNCLOS
Article 195 UNCLOS provide that all states have a duty not to transfer damage or hazards 
from one area to another, directly or indirectly. Considering the case if a coastal state should 
ban  the  transport  of  spent  nuclear  fuel  through  their  territorial  waters  or  EEZ,  justly  or 
unjustly. If such a ban is respected by the shipping country, the result  is most likely that 
another  route is  chosen.  This other route may possibly be even more dangerous than the 
original route, as it may demand that the shipment traverses a more dangerous strait, more 
heavily trafficked waters or similar. In other words, the denial of passage may in itself be 
against  the  UNCLOS,  as  it  leads  to  that  the  damage,  rather  than  being  eliminated,  is 
transferred  to  another  area.  This  is  an  argument  also  following  from that  the  UNCLOS 
favours multilateralism; a one-sided ban is no good from the perspective of the UNCLOS, 
rather, the solution would be to find a sensible international solution, making sure that safety 
is ensured throughout the vessels  journey.  Or, should a ban be justified; viewed from the 
UNCLOS  perspective,  such  a  ban  should  follow  from  an  international  or  a  regional 
agreement, rather than from national legislation. This reasoning makes sense, in the way that 
it prohibits that potential hazards are simply pushed around, until a route of non-protesters is 
found. The reasons why certain coastal states would not protest, or not be heard protesting 
does not always ground in an indifference to the practice as such, but rather that the political 
reality makes it necessary for some states to ignore certain risks in hope of gaining benefits in 
other areas. 
140 “Competent and Relevant International Organizations under the United Nations Convention of the Law of 
the Sea”, Law of the Sea Bulletin, no 31, p 79-95, 1996, p 79.
141 IAEA  is  also  mentioned  several  times  in  the  list  provided  in  “Competent  and  Relevant  International 
Organizations under the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea”, Law of the Sea Bulletin, no 31, p 
79-95, 1996. 
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Special remarks concerning the demand of prior assessment in Art 206 UNCLOS
One argument favouring prior information can be found in Art 206 UNCLOS. This article 
demands that a state assess the potential effects of an activity that “may cause substantial 
pollution” to the marine environment and is within their jurisdiction or control. The results 
shall be published or deposited at the relevant international organisation, “available to all  
States”.  The transport  of  spent  nuclear  fuel  is  a  hazardous  activity,  which  may  result  in 
substantial damage. Hence this article is applicable to such a transport. The assessment should 
be made by a vessels flag state; as the flag state has both jurisdiction and control over the 
vessel.  To  some  extent  a  coastal  state  may  be  obliged  to  investigate  a  foreign  transport 
through its territorial waters, but as it is likely to not even be aware of such a transport, this 
would be impracticable. If it has been informed about a transport, they are probably obliged to 
perform  some  kind  of  evaluation  too.  However,  it  is  not  clear  to  what  extent  such  an 
investigation should be done; according to the article they shall do so “as far as practicable”. 
The applicability of Art 206 UNCLOS was also the subject of the MOX-plant case142, which 
will be discussed in further detail below.143
Conclusions
As a conclusion, we see that  a priori, coastal states have little right to influence shipments, 
due to the principles of innocent passage and freedom of navigation. There is no possibility 
for a coastal state to demand information, prior informed consent or to ban a shipment from 
sailing through their adjacent high seas. When it comes to the territorial waters, a coastal state 
can  take  any  of  these  measures  to  the  extent  that  the  shipment  can  be  considered  non-
innocent. Still, it is not likely that a shipment is to be considered anything but innocent; hence, 
a coastal state has no right to ban the shipment or demand prior informed consent. On the 
other hand, it is likely that demanding prior information is in accordance with the UNCLOS. 
Finally,  when  it  comes  to  the  EEZ,  a  coastal  state  has  no  right  to  prevent  freedom  of 
navigation, except for what is allowed in part XII of the UNCLOS.  
However,  there  are  references  to  legislation  outside  of  the  UNCLOS  both  concerning 
navigation in the territorial waters and the EEZ; they function as a built in flexibility of the 
system. The fact that the UNCLOS is not being explicitly clear about what legislation that is 
refers  to  is  making  the  issue  more  complex,  though,  it  shall  be  remembered  that  this 
construction is deliberately done as to prevent the UNCLOS from becoming outdated too fast. 
The main principles that needs to be remembered is that there must be a reasonable balance 
between  the  rights  and  duties  of  coastal  states  and  flag  states;  but  also  that  too  narrow 
interpretations will render the UNCLOS devoid of any meaning.
The next step is hence to investigate what legislation that the UNCLOS is targeting and if any 
guidance can be found in these adjoining treaties when it comes to the right for coastal states 
to demand information about and influence on transports of spent nuclear fuel.
3.3. Regulations concerning the transport of Spent Nuclear Fuel beyond the UNCLOS
Next is hence the question of what legislation that exists concerning the transport of spent 
nuclear fuel, outside of the UNCLOS. It shall be remembered that this legislation is possibly 
incorporated through either Art 23 or Art 211.5 UNCLOS. As was already indicated above, 
the main regulatory bodies when it comes to the maritime transport of nuclear materials are 
142 The MOX-plant case (Ireland v. U.K.) 41 ILM (2002)
143 Sands, P., p 806.
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the IMO and the IAEA; but also the EURATOM and the OECD’s NEA may be relevant. In 
the  following  we  shall  consider  what  legislation  that  exists  especially  when  it  comes  to 
notification systems, safety precautions, security and possible coastal state control. 
Notification systems
After the  disaster in Chernobyl  a system of early notifications in case of an imminent or 
actual accident involving radioactive materials was constructed.144 There are several systems; 
the  main  one being the 1986 Notification  Convention.145 Furthermore,  the UNCLOS also 
addresses the issue of notification in Art 211.7. However, all of these notification systems has 
in  common  that  they  demand notification  only when the  accident  is  real  or  imminent.146 
However,  there is a significant difference between a system of notification concerning an 
actual or imminent damage and a system of prior information or prior informed consent. A 
system of prior information allows for a coastal state to take relevant measures in anticipation 
of the transport; cooperation concerning the choice of route, define specific sea lanes for the 
transport, create an own contingency plan, re-route other maritime traffic as to minimise the 
risk of damages, to give a few examples. Notification when the accident is imminent or real 
only provides for emergency measures. A country unaware of the risk until it is imminent 
does not have the same opportunities to plan and prepare as a country notified at least before 
commencing the transport. Thus, the systems of early notification, although important in their 
own right, do not provide an opportunity for coastal states to influence a transport of spent 
nuclear fuel. 
Transport related legislation
The legislation relating to the transport of nuclear materials can be divided into two groups, 
binding and non-binding legislation. The binding legislation constitutes mainly of the 1997 
Joint Convention147, the 1980 Physical Protection Convention148, the IMDG code149 and the 
INF code150. The non-binding agreements that will be discussed here are the IMO code of 
safety151 and the IAEA’s regulations for the safe transport of nuclear materials152. 
The Joint Convention deals with safety issues concerning spent fuel and radioactive waste; of 
interest in this case is mainly Art 27, dealing with transboundary transports of such materials. 
It is a system of prior notification and consent in relation to the state of destination. When it 
comes  to  transit  states,  transports  shall  be  conducted  in  accordance  with  international 
regulations  for  that  particular  mode of transport.153 Transit  states  are  defined as  any state 
“through whose territory a transboundary movement is planned or takes place”; this possibly 
includes the territorial waters, over which the coastal state has sovereignty; but probably not 
144 Sands,  P.,  Principles of International  Environmental  Law, Second Edition, Cambridge University Press, 
2003, p 647 and 844.  
145 The 1986 IAEA Convention  on Early Notification  of  a  Nuclear  Accident;  for  more  examples  see  for 
example Sands, P., p647-648 and p 844-845.
146 According to Boyle,  there have been suggestions to construct a system of earlier  notification,  after  the 
Amoco Cadiz  incident in France. However, they are not included in the current version of the UNCLOS. 
Boyle, A. E., p 395.
147 The Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste 
Management, 1997.
148 The 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
149 International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code.
150 Code for the Safe Carriage of Irradiated Nuclear Fuel, Plutonium and High-Level Radioactive Wastes in 
Flasks On Board Ships, IMO Res. A.748 (18), 1993.
151 IMO Code of Safety for Nuclear Merchant Ships, IMO Res. A. 491 (XII) Part A, 1981.
152 Regulations for the Safe Transport of Nuclear Material, IAEA 2005.
153 Art 27.1 (ii) Joint Convention
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the EEZ. However, it can be concluded that as the mode of transportation is by ship, the 
relevant international legislation is the UNCLOS, unless there is a lex specialis for maritime 
transport of spent nuclear fuel.
The INF code and the IMDG code are mandatory as they are implemented through chapter 
VII Part D SOLAS154; the IMO code of safety is referred to in Chapter VIII on Nuclear ships. 
The IMDG code is concerned with setting a safety standard for radiation levels and risks that 
humans, property and the environment reasonably can be exposed to. The INF code provides 
a number of technical  aspects on how to physically transport  and store nuclear materials; 
including design recommendations for containers and for the carrying vessel. 
The IAEA regulations155 are also concerned with technical specifications; to a large extent 
they are similar to the demands put forth in the INF and the IMDG codes. In case of transports 
not complying with the IAEA regulations, they demand multilateral approval. However as can 
be seen in the definitions156, this refers to shipments through or into another country. This 
possibly includes the territorial  waters, however,  this only concerns transports that do not 
conform to the regulations and it shall furthermore be noted that the IAEA regulations are 
only recommendations. Hence, to base a claim for prior informed consent on the IAEA code 
is  not  likely  to  have  but  advisory  effect.  As  a  conclusion,  although these  codes  provide 
detailed technical regulations, they do not affect coastal states right to influence. 
The Physical Protection Convention is concerned with securing that nuclear materials does 
not  fall  in  the  wrong  hands while  being transported  internationally.157 Art  4  (3)  Physical 
Protection Convention provides that a transit country shall not allow thoroughfare unless the 
transport fulfils the safety precautions spelled out in Annex 1 Physical Protection Convention. 
However, Art 4 (3) Physical Protection Convention also specifies transit to be  “by land or  
internal waterways or through its airports or seaports“. Thus although there is a limited duty 
to inform and give prior consent in this convention, these rights are not applicable to coastal 
states.
Conclusions
Nuclear law is an area which is internationally much and thoroughly regulated, especially 
when it comes to safeguards and technical safety issues. However, other areas concerning the 
transport of spent nuclear fuel are left unregulated. As have been shown, there are no specific 
rules or treaties that concern a coastal states right to control an  en route shipment.  Some 
regulations refer to transit states, but as have been discussed previously, coastal states are not 
always included in this group. Using a wide interpretation, a vessel traversing through coastal 
states territorial waters may be considered as a transit shipment through that country; however 
even if this is a correct analysis, it does not help the coastal state. As we have seen, the only 
regulation  demanding  multilateral  consent,  thus  including  transit  states,  is  the  IAEA 
regulations,  which  are  not  mandatory.  Secondly,  the  IAEA  regulations  only  demand 
multilateral  consent  in  the  case  of  special  transports,  not  conforming  to  the  regulations 
prescribed  in  the  document.  The  lack  of  special  rules  concerning  coastal  states  right  to 
influence means that the general rules of maritime transport shall be applied; in other words, 
the UNCLOS. 
154 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974 
155 Regulations for the Safe Transport of Nuclear Material, IAEA 2005.
156 Regulations for the Safe Transport of Nuclear Material, IAEA 2005, Section II Art 204.
157 Preamble and Art 2 Physical Protection Convention.
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Thus, we find that although nuclear transports have many rules concerning how to perform a 
safe  transport,  there  is  no  rule  allowing  coastal  states  to  investigate  themselves  if  the 
international rules are followed. As a consequence of that the existing regulation is focussed 
on narrow rules of a technical character, there is an abundance of advice on how to perform a 
transport, but no third party insight in the procedures. Considering the principles discussed in 
the previous chapter, this is a lack of transparency. The lack of information to coastal states 
mean that although that they are considered to be sovereign in their territorial waters, they 
have little opportunity to take precautions or influence on transports that take place in their 
vicinity. At the same time, rumours on certain planned transports usually leaks; resulting in an 
increased concern due to the insecurity that lies in knowing that the country is exposed to a 
risk, without being able to confront the facts and review what precautions that have been 
taken in advance by the shipper. This leads us to the fact that many countries in fact have 
protested about nuclear transports in their waters; without knowing the exact details of future 
transports, this has resulted in legislation perhaps more far-reaching than had been the case, 
had their rights been more clearly identified in international legislation. These manoeuvres 
will be considered next. 
3.4. Case Law
It is interesting to note that although, as shown by the above legislative review, the chances to 
ban a certain transport, to demand prior information or prior informed consent are small; this 
has repeatedly been done by several countries during recent years.  They have based their 
dissent  on  the  Basel  Convention  or  on  the  Precautionary  Principle.  There  are  cases  of 
legislative  manoeuvres,  reservations in  their  ratification of the UNCLOS and in one case 
Chile threatened with resort to military action; to escort a vessel carrying spent nuclear fuel 
out from its EEZ. Recently Ireland questioned Great Britain’s practice at  Sellafield in the 
MOX-plant  case158;  the  charges  were  based  on  Art  206  UNCLOS.  In  this  section  the 
reasoning behind these different manoeuvres will be presented and analysed. To what degree 
is this reasoning in line with international law?
Reservations according to Art 310 UNCLOS
To gain some insight in different ways to interpret the UNCLOS concerning transport of spent 
nuclear fuel, it is interesting to review the reservations that states have made when ratifying 
the UNCLOS.159 Argentine, Bangladesh, Egypt,  Malaysia, Malta, Oman, Saudi Arabia and 
Yemen have all been in favour of coastal state control over such vessels whereas Great Britain 
and  the  Netherlands  both  claim  that  any  demands  for  prior  notification  or  prior 
consent/permission  are  not  in  line  with  the  UNCLOS and  that  they  will  not  accept  any 
reservation with that content. 
Among the other countries  there are a few different  lines of argumentation.  The weakest 
statement  comes  from  Argentina;  they  state  that  they  consider  it  important  that  the 
international community produces more detailed rules in this respect. Malta and Bangladesh 
simply states that notification and authorization is needed before any such transport enter their 
territorial waters. 
Saudi Arabia, Malaysia and Egypt take a more diplomatic stance, concluding that they will 
demand prior authorization by such vessels until the global community has created rules on 
this  subject  and  Saudi  Arabia/Malaysia/Egypt  has  become a  party  to  such  a  convention. 
158 The MOX-plant case (Ireland v. U.K.) 41 ILM (2002)
159 See Appendix I for a list citing all reservations concerning nuclear materials.
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Hence,  these  countries  argue  that  as  the  international  agreements  referred  to  in  Art  23 
UNCLOS have not  yet  been created,  they have a  right  to  stipulate  their  demands  in  the 
meantime. However, as a counter-argument to this; there is an abundance of safety regulations 
concerning transboundary nuclear transports,  although none of them authorizes the coastal 
state with a right to demand notification or authorization. 
Oman formulates the innocent passage of nuclear vessels as a favour that will be guaranteed, 
subject to a prior permission. However, this is otherwise similar to the statements made by 
Bangladesh and Malta; stating that prior information and consent is necessary, without further 
explanation. 
Finally,  Yemen  has  chosen  a  different  line  of  argumentation.  They  argue  that  as  prior 
agreement is necessary according to the general international law of national sovereignty; thus 
they do not consider themselves acting in conflict with the UNCLOS at all, when demanding 
prior  consent.  For  a  further  discussion  of  this,  see  the  environmental  section  above, 
concerning the sovereignty principle. 
The MOX-plant case160
In the MOX-plant case, Ireland expressed their concerns over that Great Britain allowed the 
expansion of Sellafield with a MOX-plant. Ireland apply for provisional measures, to prevent 
Great Britain from commencing the plant before the final award is given. They claim that 
both the transports to and from the Sellafield plant as well as the plant itself pose a great risk.
The Irish side claim that the British have failed to attend to the principles of cooperation as 
they are expressed in Art 123 and 197 UNCLOS; as well as they recall that it also exists in 
international  customary  law.161 Secondly,  they  claim  that  Great  Britain  have  failed  to 
undertake a  prior environmental  assessment  according to Art  206 UNCLOS.162 They also 
claim that it is motivated to apply the precautionary principle when assessing the UNCLOS 
based on that Art 293 UNCLOS include “other rules of international law” as applicable to 
dispute  resolution  and  that  the  precautionary  principle  is  now  “recognised  as  a  rule  of 
customary international law”163
The tribunal finds that “the duty to cooperate [is] a fundamental principle in the regime of the  
prevention of pollution of the marine environment  under Part XII  of  the Convention and  
general international law.”164 This is expressed in the award as a duty for the two countries to 
cooperate and to enter into consultations concerning exchange of information, risk monitoring 
and devising appropriate measures to prevent pollution.165 Hence it seems that at least between 
160 Note that another important question when it comes to the MOX-plant case is that of concurrent jurisdiction, 
in this case between the ITLOS and the ECJ. The ECJ later concluded that it had exclusive jurisdiction over 
the  dispute.  This  issue  is  intriguing  but  must  be  left  out,  due  to  the  limited  scope  of  this  thesis.  See 
“Concurrent Jurisdiction: European and International  – Concurrence of Jurisdiction between the ECJ and 
other International Courts and Tribunals”, European Environmental Law Review, 213-225, 2005, Lavranos, 
N., “MOX Plant and Exclusive ECJ Jurisdiction – The MOX Plant judgement of the ECJ: How exclusive is 
the jurisdiction of the ECJ?”, European Environmental Law Review, 213-225, 2005.
161 Request for Provisional Measures and Statement of Case of Ireland, the MOX Plant Case (Ireland v. United 
Kingdom), p 29. Accessible on http://www.itlos.org/cgi-bin/cases/case_detail.pl?id=10&lang=en#order
162 Request for Provisional Measures and Statement of Case of Ireland, p 27.
163 Request for Provisional Measures and Statement of Case of Ireland, p 43.
164 Joint declaration of Judges Caminos, Yamamoto, Park, Akl, Marsit, Eiriksson and Jesus, the MOX Plant 
Case (Ireland v. United Kingdom). Accessible on 
http://www.itlos.org/cgi-bin/cases/case_detail.pl?id=10&lang=en#order
165 The MOX-plant case (Ireland v. U.K.) 41 ILM (2002) 
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neighbouring states, there is a far reaching duty to cooperate and consult when it comes to this 
type of transports. This is an opinion that is seemingly expressed in all the separate opinions 
of the case, for example by Judge Wolfrum in the following paragraph;
I fully endorse, however, paragraphs 82 to 84 of the Order, considering that the obligation to cooperate is 
the  overriding  principle  of  international  environmental  law,  in  particular  when  the  interests  of  
neighbouring  States  are  at  stake.   The  duty  to  cooperate  denotes  an  important  shift  in  the  general  
orientation of the international legal order.  It balances the principle of sovereignty of States and thus  
ensures that community interests are taken into account vis-à-vis individualistic State interests.  It is a  
matter of prudence and caution as well as in keeping with the overriding nature of the obligation to co-
operate that the parties should engage therein as prescribed in paragraph 89 of the Order.166
However,  the MOX-plant case was special  since it  concerned two neighbouring countries 
with a semi-enclosed sea in-between them and that it did not only concern the transport but 
also the commencement of a permanent site. Thus it is not self-evident that the ITLOS would 
come to the same conclusion were there no permanent construction, but only a ship passing 
through the territorial waters or the EEZ of a distant country en route to its destination. 
When it comes to the applicability of the precautionary principle and Art 206 of the UNCLOS 
the  award  does  not  give  much  guidance.  Judge  ad  hoc Székely  (nominated  by  Ireland) 
criticizes the outcome in his separate award; he considers particularly the inadequate quality 
of the British environmental  impact  statement as a breach of Art 206 and something that 
require a provisional measure. Judge  ad hoc Székely also implies that the tribunal’s award 
was a diplomatic product; a compromise, rather than the correct legal solution. Furthermore, 
he  is  of  the  opinion  that  due  to  the  lack  of  evidence  supporting  the  United  Kingdoms 
allegations  that  the  practice  was  harmless;  the  tribunal  should  have  employed  the 
precautionary principle; or in other words, a reversed burden of proof resulting in that Ireland 
should be granted the provisional measures.167 
Presumably,  these would have been important issues that the actual arbitral tribunal would 
have  needed  to  assess.168 However,  it  has  been  concluded  that  the  ECJ  have  exclusive 
jurisdiction over the issue; hence the case is not likely to be finally tried by the ITLOS.169 
Thus, concluding this discussion on the MOX-plant case we find that the applicability of the 
precautionary principle or the Art 206 UNCLOS is not confirmed in the MOX-plant case. But 
perhaps more importantly, it is neither ruled out. In the next section, other examples of when 
the precautionary principle has been applied will be investigated. Finally, the MOX-plant case 
have  indicated  that  the  cooperation  principle  perhaps  may  be  applied  to  demand  prior 
consultation including information on a transport of spent nuclear fuel. At the same time, the 
MOX-plant case is different from the case of en route coastal states, something that makes it 
difficult to generalize this conclusion to the latter situation. 
The Precautionary Principle
The precautionary principle have been used as an argument in deterring shipments of spent 
nuclear  fuel  from  certain  countries  EEZs  more  or  less  explicit  in  a  number  of  cases; 
particularly concerning the shipments of radioactive materials between Japan and France or 
166 Separate  opinion of  Judge Wolfrum, the MOX Plant  Case (Ireland  v.  United Kingdom) Accessible on 
http://www.itlos.org/cgi-bin/cases/case_detail.pl?id=10&lang=en#order
167 Separate opinion of Judge ad hoc Székely, the MOX Plant Case (Ireland v. United Kingdom) Accessible on 
http://www.itlos.org/cgi-bin/cases/case_detail.pl?id=10&lang=en#order
168 Sands, P., p 807
169 Lavranos, N., both articles. 
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the United Kingdom.170 In the following, I have chosen to highlight Chile, as an example. 
However, also New Zealand has explicitly applied the precautionary principle; it is also often 
implicit in the statements of protesting countries.
The 1994/95 shipment with the Pacific Pintail was scheduled to sail the Cape Horn route. The 
shipment was banned by a number of countries; including Chile. At the time, the Chilean 
Nuclear  Law did  not  contain  any regulations  regarding shipments  of  nuclear  materials.171 
However, the Chilean foreign minister stated that the country had “enough legal arguments  
to protect human health, ecology and the environment in the area to demand that this boat  
not pass through Chilean territorial waters."172 Following this decree, when the Pacific Pintail 
still  enters  the  Chilean  EEZ  it  was  interrupted  by  Chilean  navy,  demanding  that  it 
immediately  steer  away  from  Chilean  waters  or  they  would  be  “exposed  to  the  use  of  
weapons”.173 The  motivation  was  that  “the  carrying  of  your  radioactive  material  is  a  
violation of the precaution principle”174 
This shall be compared with the current wording of the Chilean Nuclear Law, which since 
2002 demands advance consultation and consent  “for the entrance or transit  through the  
national  territory,  exclusive  economic  zone,  [and  the] territorial  sea”.175 To  receive  the 
commission’s  approval  “the  applicant  shall  provide  the  dates  of  when  the  transport  
commences, the routes and areas traveled, the characteristics of the load and the contingency  
and safety measures.”176 This description is remarkably similar to the Van Dyke proposal of 
what the precautionary principle contains; prior information and consultation in combination 
with an environmental impact assessment. 
Perhaps the Chilean case is particularly strong as the waters around Cape Horn are known to 
be difficult; thus it becomes increasingly important for Chile to know that the environmental 
assessment done by the shipping country takes into account the particular hazards of this area. 
Furthermore, who would be better suited to inform about local conditions, but the  en route 
nation in question? 
Applying  the  precautionary  principle;  the  conclusion  is  that  as  a  shipment  of  radioactive 
materials poses a significant risk to the environment, the reversed burden of proof demands 
that the shipper demonstrates to the en route state that they have adopted an adequate level of 
safety and security measures, reducing the risk to an acceptable level. Thus, an application of 
the  precautionary  principle  to  the  shipment  of  radioactive  material  would  contain  three 
important steps; the shipping party must undertake an environmental impact assessment, the 
shipping party must  inform all  parties  that  may be affected so that  they can evaluate the 
quality of the assessment and finally, all the en route states must give their consent, provided 
that the information is satisfactory. 
170 For  more  details  concerning  these  shipments  and the  opinions  of  protesting  countries  and NGOs,  see 
http://www.nci.org/seatrans.htm and Van Dyke, J. M., “Applying the precautionary principle [...]”.
171 Ley de Seguridad Nuclear, LEY Núm. 18.302, 1984 (Chile’s Law for Nuclear Safety) 
172 Citation taken from footnote 93, Van Dyke, J. M., “Applying the precautionary principle [...]”
173 Citation taken from radio transcript, March 20 1995, see footnote 22 in Dixon, D. B., p 6. 
174 Citation  taken from radio  transcript,  March 20 1995,  see footnote  3,  Van Dyke,  J.  M.,  “Applying  the 
precautionary principle [...]”.
175 Chile’s  Law for Nuclear Safety & Ley Núm. 19.825, 2002 modifica la ley nº 18.302, sobre Seguridad 
Nuclear (amendment to Chiles Law for Nuclear Safety). See appendix II for an excerpt of the relevant article 
and a translation into English.
176 Chile’s Law for Nuclear Safety & amendment to Chiles Law for Nuclear Safety. See appendix II for an 
excerpt of the relevant article and a translation into English.
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EU and the Precautionary Principle – Are there special conditions in the European Union?
Transportation of nuclear materials  within the EU is subject  to legislation specific for the 
region.  As  previously noted,  the  precautionary principle  is  to  be considered in all  of  the 
community’s  activities,  according  to  Art  174.2  EC  Treaty  read  together  with  Art  6  EC 
Treaty.177 This may have implications on how for example, how to interpret the UNCLOS, if a 
shipment is destined or originated in an EC country. That transports of spent nuclear fuel is an 
area that falls under the EC’s competence has been decided by the ECJ in their decision on the 
MOX-plant case.178 Hence, this section will give a short review of the EC legislation on the 
transport  of nuclear fuel,  concerning what rights a coastal  state has to influence a certain 
shipment of spent nuclear fuel. The purpose of this section is to find if the EC regulation is 
different from the international legislation and if the mandatory character of the precautionary 
principle in the EU makes a difference. 
The Commissions mandate when it comes to the transport of nuclear materials is based on a 
joint reading of Title V EC Treaty and Chapter III of the EURATOM Treaty.179 Hence, the 
Commission has issued a number of directives on the subject. Since 1992 the transport of 
radioactive waste has been regulated in 92/3/Euratom; this document separates between spent 
nuclear fuel for reprocessing and spent nuclear fuel to be finally deposited of.180 The directive 
hence  covers  radioactive  wastes  but  not  products.  However,  there  is  no  other  difference 
between the two types of spent nuclear fuel than its destined use; a political decision. Thus, 
2006/117/Euratom was adopted to replace the old directive; the latter enters into force the 
latest 25 December 2008.181 The distinction between nuclear waste as a product and as waste 
with no foreseeable usage area is kept; but this time both types are covered by the directive. 
As the new directive is to be implemented by the member states as soon as possible, I have 
chosen  to  refrain  from  discussing  the  old,  but  for  another  year,  still  valid  directive 
92/3/Euratom.
Art  1.2  (a)  2006/117/Euratom  provides  that  the  directive  is  applicable  to  transports  of 
radioactive  waste  and  spent  fuel  if  the  country  of  origin,  transit  or  destination  is  an  EC 
member state. In the definitions we find that a transit state is defined as a state through which 
territory a shipment is transported; this probably includes the territorial  water,  but does it 
include  the  EEZ?  It  is  interesting  to  compare  this  definition  with  the  one  in  the  Basel 
Convention182 where the territory includes all areas under national jurisdiction; defined as the 
areas  where  the  country  has  a  regulatory  or  administrative  responsibility  according  to 
international law; thus including the EEZ. 
The 2006/117/Euratom provides that for transports within the community transit states shall 
be notified and respond with a request for information, a consent or a denial. For transports 
destined to the  community from a  third  country the  same procedure applies.  For  transits 
through  the  EC  an  application  must  be  sent  to  the  first  country  of  transit  and  must  be 
confirmed by all EC countries of transit before the transport is commenced. In addition to this, 
a report of that the cargo has arrived at its destination must be delivered. Similar rules apply 
177 Art 174 EC Treaty is an environmental protection requirement, and must thus be integrated in the definition 
and implementation of the community policies and activities, according to Art 6 EC Treaty. 
178 Lavranos, N., both articles.
179 Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community.
180 Council  Directive  92/3/Euratom  of  3  February  1992  on  the  supervision  and  control  of  shipments  of 
radioactive waste between Member States and into and out of the Community, ineffective from 25 Dec 2008.
181 Council Directive 2006/117/Euratom of 20 November 2006 on the supervision and control of shipments of 
radioactive waste and spent fuel. Enters into force the latest 25 Dec 2008, Art 22.
182 See further discussion on this in the next section on the Basel Convention.
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to shipment destined from the EC to a third country. At the same time, a refusal must not be 
discriminatory; demands can not be significantly different than other member states, therefore 
a ban would not be in coherence with the EC legislation. However, this still means that the 
transit country has a right to receive information about a shipment and evaluate whether or not 
it is on par with international standards.183
Thus, we find that the EC regulation concerning the transport of spent nuclear fuel is strict; 
transit states are entitled to prior information and may reject an unsatisfactory application. 
Furthermore,  these rules apply to all  shipments entering EC territory, whether or not it  is 
destined or originating from there.  However,  it  is not entirely clear what a transit  state is 
according to 2006/117/Euratom. If this include the EEZ, the EC regulation have followed in 
the steps of for example Chile, in concluding that the UNCLOS does not preclude a prior 
notification and consent procedure when it comes to nuclear materials. Such an interpretation 
of  the  UNCLOS can  be  motivated,  as  seen  above,  with  arguing  that  the  latter  shall  be 
interpreted  in  the  light  of  the  precautionary  principle.  As  the  precautionary  principle  is 
mandatory in the EC the restrictions to the freedom of navigation that are imposed by the 
2006/117/Euratom can be motivated on a community level. However, as noted above, it is not 
certain  that  such  a  defence  could  work  on  an  international  level,  as  the  status  of  the 
precautionary principle still is not certain.184
The Basel Convention185
One argument in favour for a duty of advance consultation that is sometimes brought forward 
is that demands on notification or prior informed consent are common for other hazardous 
wastes; that nuclear wastes are excepted is a produce of military history that should no longer 
be  sanctioned.186 In  order  to  evaluate  this  argument,  a  closer  examination  on the  general 
regulation  controlling  maritime  transport  of  hazardous  wastes  must  be  done;  the  Basel 
Convention being the main international instrument in this area. Before assessing what rights 
that  exist  for  coastal  states  under  the  Basel  Convention,  an  Argentine  court  case  will 
demonstrate  that  it  is  possible  to  argue  that  the  convention  should  apply  also  to  nuclear 
wastes.  By  doing  this,  Argentina,  rather  than  claiming  that  the  Basel  conventions  non-
applicability  is  a non sequitur,  claim that  the  discrepancy between transboundary nuclear 
transport regulations and the Basel Convention is proving the non-existence of  lex specialis 
for such transports and that thus the Basel Convention is applicable.
The Argentine declaration in their ratification of the UNCLOS187 was quite vague. However it 
is clear that they find the existing regulation on the transport of nuclear fuel to be insufficient. 
This opinion was followed up in 2004 with a court case prohibiting the decommissioned San 
Onofre Nuclear Reactor188 to be transported through its EEZ, citing the Basel Convention and 
183 R-07-11,  Cramér,  P.,  Stendahl,  S.,  Erhag,  T.,  “Nationellt  ansvar  för  använt  kärnbränsle  i  en  utvidgad 
Europeisk Union”, SKB 2007, p 88-89.
184 It would be interesting to examine further the question if the EC legislation on radioactive materials perhaps 
even is a hindrance to world trade, according to the GATT/WTO.
185 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal
186 Louka, E., p 435.
187 See except in Appendix I
188 The issue concerned the transport of the decommissioned pieces of a south Californian nuclear reactor to a 
final deposit site on the American east coast. The sea route, passing the Cape Horn was preferred due to 
concern over the U.S. liability regulations. In the end, the transport was cancelled. See Currie, D. E. J., and 
Van Dyke, J. M., “Recent Developments in the International Law Governing Shipments of Nuclear Materials 
and their Implications for SIDS”, Review of European Communities & International Environmental Law, 14 
(2), pp 117-124, 2005, p 118-119.
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the Argentine Constitution as motivating this decision.189 
However,  Art 1, Section 3 of the Basel Convention explicitly excludes radioactive wastes 
from  its  scope,  to  the  extent  they  are  subject  to  other  international  control  systems  or 
instruments. As we have seen above, spent nuclear fuel are subject to a multitude of safety 
and security regulations; although none of them relates to a coastal states right to prohibit a 
transport from its EEZ. Presumably, this led Judge Pfleger in the San Onofre-case to conclude 
that the Basel Convention was applicable to the transport of the decommissioned plant as 
there were no specific regulations providing the same protection as the Basel Convention. 
Whether or not Judge Pfleger is right, the means that the Basel Convention lends to a coastal 
state wishing to influence on a shipment of materials are interesting to examine. Because if 
the  Basel  Convention  is  not  applicable  to  nuclear  transports,  and  there  is  a  discrepancy 
between regulations of the two, it indicates that either that the area of nuclear transportation 
should be regulated in a different way or that there is a significant difference between nuclear 
and other hazardous wastes that makes the latter more worthy of protection. 
First  of  all,  we find under  the definitions  of the Basel  Convention that  a  “transboundary 
movement” includes traversing ”through an area under the national jurisdiction of another  
State”190. Such an area is defined as “any land, marine area or airspace within which a State  
exercises  administrative  and  regulatory  responsibility  in  accordance  with  international  
law”191 This clearly includes not only the territorial waters, but also the EEZ, as the latter is an 
area sui generis, in which the coastal state has a limited jurisdictional right in contrast to the 
high  seas  character  of  res  communis  omnium.  Hence,  we  find  that  when  a  transport  is 
scheduled to traverse the territorial waters or the EEZ of an en route coastal state being also a 
party to the Basel Convention; the state is defined as a “transit state”.192 Should the en route 
coastal  state  not  be  a  party  to  the  Basel  Convention  they  still  classify  under  “states 
concerned”.193 Note  that  the  Basel  Convention explicitly  defends  the  right  to  freedom of 
navigation and innocent passage; but also the coastal states rights in their EEZs and territorial 
waters.194
The Basel Convention also emphases the principle of cooperation, similar to the result of the 
MOX-plant case.195 This can be seen as another argument in favour of that the cooperation 
principle must be attended to, not only between neighbouring countries but in situations of 
transport.  As  the  principle  of  cooperation is  a  general  principle  of  international  law,  this 
serves as an argument in favour of the coastal states right to information, even though the 
Basel Convention is not196 directly applicable to radioactive materials. 
Furthermore,  the  Basel  Convention  prescribes  that  the  exporter  must  notify  each  state 
189 “El Juez Federal de Chubut Hizo Lugar a una Medida Cautelar Presentada por el Gobernador das Neves y 
Prohibio el Ingreso de un Barco con Basura Nuclear a Aguas Argentinas”, News article from the Chubut 
governmental homepage, http://www.chubut.gov.ar/noticias_old/archives/2004_01.php,  See also Currie, D. 
E. J. and Van Dyke, J. M., “Recent Developments in the International Law Governing Shipments of Nuclear 
Materials and their Implications for SIDS”, p 119.
190 Art 2.3 Basel Convention 
191 Art 2.9 Basel Convention  
192 Art 2.12 Basel Convention
193 Art 2.13 Basel Convention
194 Art 4.12 Basel Convention
195 Art 4.2 (h) and Art 10 Basel Convention 
196 Unless Judge Pfleger is right in the San Onofre-case.
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concerned197.  States  of  transit  may respond “consenting to the  movement  with  or  without  
conditions, denying permission for the movement, or requesting additional information.”198 
States of transit that are not parties to the convention are still entitled to receive a notification, 
although their reply is not needed for the shipment to commence.199
Finally,  the  Basel  Convention  does  not  seem  to  allow  an  unconditional  ban  of  transit 
shipments; although a ban on imports is possible. However as the Basel Convention provides 
for a notification procedure as described above, it is theoretically possible for a state to refuse 
permission every time a shipment is scheduled through their territorial waters or EEZ.
As a conclusion, coastal state control within the Basel Convention system is far reaching. 
Apart  from  a  general  demand  on  cooperation  and  providing  information  on  request; 
notification is necessary before any shipment of hazardous waste through a coastal states EEZ 
or territorial waters. In case the coastal state is a party to the convention, such a transport may 
not take place without prior consent. 
However, the Basel Convention has explicitly excluded nuclear materials from its scope. It is 
not likely that arguing that the lack of a similar regulation in the area of nuclear transports 
makes the Basel Convention applicable. However, acknowledging that much less dangerous, 
although still hazardous materials are thoroughly regulated in the Basel Convention whilst 
nuclear materials are excepted from this practice is a good argument for an improvement of 
the latter regulation. 
3.5. Evaluation and Conclusions  
The main conclusion of this section is that the UNCLOS does leave some room for taking into 
consideration  environmental  concerns  of  coastal  states.  However,  it  is  not  clear  what 
measures that are reasonable within this room of manoeuvre. It is clear though, that many 
countries consider themselves entitled to information and consultation, with a right to ban a 
certain transport that does not live up to their environmental standards.
Perhaps it is possible to use a deductive reasoning to illustrate why many countries argue that 
their demands on prior consent or prior information are legal according to the UNCLOS. They 
may argue that the main purpose is not to restrict the freedom of navigation. The right of 
navigation  is  restricted  as  a  consequence  of  the  main  purpose,  which  is  to  protect  the 
environment.  Furthermore,  the  restriction  of  certain  types  of  traffic  in  the  short  run may 
actually be the a way to preserve the possibility of any navigation in the long run, as the 
consequence  of  an  accident  would  result  in  a  complete  restriction  of  the  freedom  of 
navigation for all traffic. 
Following this line of reasoning, a restriction on certain traffic is reasonable, considering that 
this traffic’s right to freedom of navigation may unjustly bereave all other traffic this right for 
an indeterminable amount of time. 
197 I.e.  including all transit states, also those who are not parties to the Basel Convention. See Art 6 Basel 
Convention.
198 Art 6.4 Basel Convention 
199 Art 7 and 6.1 Basel Convention
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4. REFLECTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
4.1. Reflections 
As repeatedly shown, it is, according to international law not possible to issue a ban on  en 
route  shipments  of  spent  nuclear  fuel  through  coastal  states  waters.  Still,  this  have  been 
frequently and  successfully done; despite exceeding the coastal state mandate according to 
international law. The U.S. refrained from shipping the San Onofre nuclear reactor around the 
Cape Horn. Requests or bans from South America, Portugal, New Zealand, Brazil, Nauru and 
Kiribati of the substance that specific shipments of Japanese plutonium stay out of their EEZs 
was also complied with. Many other countries made reservations in the UNCLOS, although 
they are strictly speaking, not binding. Thus, one may wonder; why does it work? 
One answer may be that there is a new state practice with the content that states have a right 
to ban or demand prior consultation when it comes to the transboundary transport of spent 
nuclear fuel. However, complying countries have been careful with pointing out that their 
adherence is not due to written or customary law; but to adhere to friendly requests. Thus, the 
argument for a new state practice is not very convincing.
A  second  answer  may  be  found  in  ad  hoc Judge  Székely’s  and  ad  hoc Judge  Shearers 
statements on that the tribunals are inclined to resort to diplomacy, in the MOX plant case and 
the Southern Bluefin Tuna case, respectively. Judge Shearer expressed it in these words:
It seems to me, with respect, that the Tribunal, in its prescription of measures in this case, has behaved 
less as a court of law and more as an agency of diplomacy.  While diplomacy, and a disposition to assist 
the parties in resolving their dispute amicably, have their proper place in the judicial settlement of  
international disputes, the Tribunal should not shrink from the consequences of proven facts. 200
My point is that in the international arena, diplomatics, or realist power politics still weigh 
heavier  than the rule of law. Thus,  countries  generally  seek to keep other nations happy; 
anything else would be asking for trouble. Especially due to the hazardous nature of spent 
nuclear fuel as cargo, it is understandable that the shipping nations prefer to sail the high seas, 
as  to  avoid  starting  an  international  conflict.  As  all  countries,  except  possibly  France  or 
Finland, struggle against a public inclined to question the practice of nuclear power, if given 
opportunity, most companies engaging in this trade quite wisely seem to try to keep a low 
profile. This is an order that has worked in the past.
However, I argue here that in the case that the number of nuclear transports and parties on the 
market increase further, the problem will be of a different magnitude. This is likely to further 
trigger coastal state concern; either to demand new regulations at an international level, or 
simply to issue a nuclear transport ban; as have worked previously. At the same time, the 
number of routes for transboundary transportation are limited. If a shipping state is confronted 
with ban’s to stay out of enough EEZs as to not be able to complete the journey, they are 
likely to try to assert the rights to free navigation and innocent passage, that they are entitled 
to according to the UNCLOS. 
In that situation, political argumentation is not likely to work. Bearing in mind that many of 
the states concerned are small island states; it is not unlikely that they will have to give in to 
political pressure from economically and militarily more powerful states. Hence, I argue that 
200 Separate opinion of Judge ad hoc Shearer, Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (Australia v. Japan; New Zealand v. 
Japan), Provisional Measures, Cases No. 3 and 4, ITLOS. 
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perhaps a better solution than relying on that a realist political view of the world will keep 
balancing the rights of coastal states with flag states rights is to create a more complete and 
comprehensive regulation for the transport of nuclear waste, than the patchwork of legislation 
currently in use. 
4.2. Conclusions 
Recalling the questions posed in the introduction; I set out to examine what possibilities that 
an  en route  coastal state has to be informed about, and influence on, a certain shipment of 
spent nuclear fuel; in its territorial waters, the EEZ and the high seas.
To find the answer of this question, I began with examining what principles that may be of 
relevance to understanding where the actual conflict lies. The examination began with nuclear 
law; the principles of transparency, safety and security was initially discussed. Although that 
the dual usage areas of nuclear material and the military history of nuclear research has been 
an argument in favour of secrecy; the introduction of a peaceful nuclear industry have resulted 
in that, at least on a national level, democratic demands on transparency and public access to 
information  have  replaced  the  initial  tradition  of  secrecy.  At  the  same  time,  the  fear  of 
terrorism and increasing resistance from the public and other countries was arguments to keep 
secrecy about nuclear transports. 
It was also concluded that the principles of compliance and international cooperation were 
strong incentives for transboundary information about nuclear practices in general. Secondly, 
as noted when moving into the area of environmental principles, the principle of cooperation 
is a customary principle of international law. The discussion on environmental principles was 
focussed on the principles of cooperation, the sovereignty principle the preventive and the 
precautionary  principle.  The  first  three  are  general  principles  of  international  law;  the 
precautionary principle is especially strong in the EC. There are reasons to believe that the 
latter is about to become internationally accepted, although it can not be said to be there yet; it 
has been used as a base for decisions by international tribunals, although not explicitly named.
Thus, it was found that the principles of free navigation and innocent passage were the main 
obstacles to increased coastal state control. However, it was also shown that the UNCLOS is 
constructed to adjust with changes in the international legal sphere, as to not become outdated 
too  fast.  There  are  also  obligations  within  the  UNCLOS  to  cater  for  the  environment, 
something that indicates that new environmental principles should be taken into account when 
construing the extent of the freedom of navigation and innocent passage.
When analysing the case law and the actual  legislation concerning transboundary nuclear 
transportation  it  was  found that  the  UNCLOS is  the  controlling  treaty when it  comes  to 
coastal state control; as other legislation on nuclear transportation mostly address technical 
questions on security and safety issues; such as the design of the containers, the vessels and 
the flasks. However, whether or not the UNCLOS allowed coastal state control could not be 
said with authority. In combination with the case law, it was found that a coastal state may 
probably demand prior information, but a total ban is out of the question. 
As seen in the reservations to the UNCLOS, many countries find that they have a right to give 
prior  consent;  however,  other  states  proclaim  that  there  is  not  even  a  right  to  prior 
information. The examples of the Basel Convention and the situation in the EC are further 
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argument for that a system of prior notification and consent should be applicable also for 
nuclear cargo. In these situations there is no right to refuse a shipment that is in accordance 
with international rules; but it provides a tool for the countries to receive advance information 
and to be able to control that the environmental impact assessment and contingency plans are 
correctly executed.  We have seen in the example of oil  tanker regulation that the EC are 
capable to bring the rest of the international community with them in implementing higher 
standards; it is not unlikely that this may work also with the issue of nuclear materials. As can 
be seen in Appendix I of this thesis, the United Kingdom and Netherlands were the only two 
countries issuing reservations against coastal state control in this issue.201  As both the United 
Kingdom  and  the  Netherlands  are  part  of  the  EU,  they  are  not  likely  to  insist  on  this 
standpoint; such persistence would only lead to that they would have to adhere to stricter 
demands than would the rest of the world. The revised EC directive on controlling shipments 
of radioactive waste was issued as late as the 20th November 2006202 and is not to be finally 
implemented until the end of 2008. The major difference with this directive was, as concluded 
above, that it does not except spent fuel for reprocessing. Thus, would a shipment such as the 
ones  between  Japan  and  France/United  Kingdom  take  place  today;  there  would  be  a 
mandatory notification and prior consent procedure applying at least to European waters.
At the moment, however, it is likely that the EC regulation on nuclear materials, together with 
the Chilean Nuclear Safety Law and the other countries that demand prior consent, actually 
are in conflict with the UNCLOS. Thus, the main conclusion of this thesis is that although the 
legislation  of  today  is  a  patchwork  of  different  treaties,  from  which  a  straight  answer 
concerning the legal status of coastal state influence on en route shipments is hard to extract; 
seemingly it is an area in transition. If transports of nuclear materials are to continue, it is 
certain that these are issues that will have to be resolved. The better solution is probably to 
include a section in the Joint Convention, defining what rights coastal states have to influence 
en  route  shipments;  perhaps  modelled  after  the  EC  regulation  or  the  Basel  Convention. 
However, to directly include nuclear materials into the Basel Convention is not likely to be a 
good idea, as many countries still wish to reserve their right to ship their nuclear waste to a 
common terminal storage situated in another country. 
4.3. Postscript
The purpose of this final section is to recall the example of AB SVAFO, mentioned in the 
beginning  and  to  apply  the  results  of  this  thesis  to  examine  why  they  decided  to  keep 
concerned parties informed.
As the old EC directive did not include transport of spent fuel for reprocessing and the new 
directive has yet  to be implemented, we find that AB SVAFO had no obligation to share 
information to en route states. Instead, this thesis has shown that the reason why AB SVAFO 
chose to disclose the transport to the concerned coastal states was not out of legal obligation, 
but  of  diplomatic  reasons,  based  on  an  emerging  new  perspective,  shifting  the  coastal 
state/flag state balance. Also, AB SVAFO are likely to be extra sensitive to current trends in 
international legislation not to attract more public attention than necessary,  as the issue of 
exporting spent fuel in contrast with the Swedish nuclear policy is delicate.
201 However, there are likely to be other countries also opposing this, which has not chosen to issue statements 
when ratifying the UNCLOS.
202 Council Directive 2006/117/Euratom of 20 November 2006 on the supervision and control of shipments of 
radioactive waste and spent fuel.
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APPENDIX I: RESERVATIONS UPON RATIFICATION OF THE UNCLOS
Many  countries  have  made  reservations  in  connection  to  the  transboundary  transport  of 
nuclear materials in accordance with Art 310 UNCLOS. This list is compiled citing relevant 
sections from the UN official list of reservations.203 In the following they are sorted depending 
on their view on coastal state control. Netherlands and Great Britain have stated that they do 
not accept any states demand on prior notification in the case of nuclear transport. The rest of 
the countries favour this interpretation.
Does not accept prior notification
Netherlands
 “The  Convention  permits  innocent  passage  in  the  territorial  sea  for  all  ships,  including 
foreign  warships,  nuclear-powered  ships  and  ships  carrying  nuclear  or  hazardous  waste, 
without any prior consent or notification, and with due observance of special precautionary 
measures established for such ships by international agreements. “
Great Britain
 “The United Kingdom cannot accept any declaration or statement made or to be made in the 
future which is not in conformity with articles 309 and 310 of the Convention. Article 309 of 
the Convention prohibits reservations and exceptions (except those expressly permitted by 
other articles of the Convention). Under article 310 declarations and statements made by a 
State cannot exclude or modify the legal effect of the provisions of the Convention in their 
application to the State concerned. 
The  United  Kingdom  considers  that  declarations  and  statements  not  in  conformity  with 
articles 309 and 310 include, inter alia, the following: [...]
- those which purport to require any form of notification or permission before warships or 
other ships exercise the right of innocent passage or freedom of navigation or which otherwise 
purport to limit navigational rights in ways not permitted by the Convention;”
In favour of increased coastal state control
Argentine
“(e) The Argentine Republic fully respects the right of free navigation as embodied in the 
Convention; however, it considers that the transit by sea of vessels carrying highly radioactive 
substances must be duly regulated.
The Argentine Government accepts the provisions on prevention of pollution of the marine 
environment contained in Part XII of the Convention, but considers that, in the light of events 
subsequent to the adoption of that international instrument, the measures to prevent, control 
and minimize the effects of the pollution of the sea by noxious and potentially dangerous 
substances and highly active radioactive substances must be supplemented and reinforced.”
Bangladesh
“4. Bangladesh is of the view that such a notification requirement is needed in respect of 
203 http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm
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nuclear-powered ships or ships carrying  nuclear  or other  inherently  dangerous or noxious 
substances. Furthermore, no such ships shall be allowed within Bangladesh waters without the 
necessary authorization. “
Egypt
“Declaration  concerning  the  passage  of  nuclear-powered  and  similar  ships  through  the 
territorial sea of Egypt
Pursuant  to  the provisions  of  the Convention relating  to  the  right  of  the coastal  State  to 
regulate the passage of ships through its territorial sea and whereas the passage of foreign 
nuclear-powered ships and ships carrying nuclear or other inherently dangerous and noxious 
substances poses a number of hazards,
Whereas  article  23  of  the  Convention  stipulates  that  the  ships  in  question  shall,  when 
exercising  the  right  of  innocent  passage  through  the  territorial  sea,  carry  documents  and 
observe  special  precautionary  measures  established  for  such  ships  by  international 
agreements,
The  Government  of  the  Arab  Republic  of  Egypt  declares  that  it  will  require  the 
aforementioned ships to obtain authorization before entering the territorial sea of Egypt, until 
such international agreements are concluded and Egypt becomes a party to them.”
Malaysia
 “4.  In view of the inherent  danger entailed in the passage of nuclear-powered vessels or 
vessels  carrying nuclear  material  or other material  of a similar nature and in view of the 
provision of article 22, paragraph 2, of the Convention on the Law of the Sea concerning the 
right of the coastal State to confine the passage of such vessels to sea lanes designated by the 
State within its territorial sea, as well as that of article 23 of the Convention, which requires 
such vessels to carry documents and observe special precautionary measures as specified by 
international agreements, the Malaysian Government, with all of the above in mind, requires 
the aforesaid vessels to obtain prior authorization of passage before entering the territorial sea 
of  Malaysia  until  such  time  as  the  international  agreements  referred  to  in  article  23  are 
concluded and Malaysia becomes a party thereto. Under all circumstances, the flag State of 
such vessels shall assume all responsibility for any loss or damage resulting from the passage 
of such vessels within the territorial sea of Malaysia.” 
Malta
 “Malta is also of the view that such a notification requirement is needed in respect of nuclear-
powered ships or ships carrying nuclear or other inherently dangerous or noxious substances. 
Furthermore,  no  such  ships  shall  be  allowed  within  Maltese  internal  waters  without  the 
necessary authorization. “
Oman
“Declaration No. 3, on the passage of nuclear-powered ships and the like through Omani 
territorial waters
With regard to foreign nuclear-powered ships and ships carrying nuclear or other substances 
that are inherently dangerous or harmful to health or the environment, the right of innocent 
passage,  subject  to  prior permission,  is  guaranteed to the types  of vessel,  whether  or not 
warships,  to  which the descriptions apply.  This  right  is  also guaranteed to submarines  to 
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which the descriptions apply, on condition that they navigate on the surface and fly the flag of 
their home State.”
Saudi Arabia
 “6.  In view of the inherent  danger entailed in the passage of nuclear-powered vessels or 
vessels  carrying nuclear  material  or other material  of a similar nature and in view of the 
provision of article 22, paragraph 2, of the Convention on the Law of the Sea concerning the 
right of the coastal State to confine the passage of such vessels to sea lanes designated by the 
State within its territorial sea, as well as that of article 23 of the Convention, which requires 
such vessels to carry documents and observe special precautionary measures as specified by 
international  agreements,  the  Kingdom of  Saudi  Arabia,  with  all  of  the  above  in  mind, 
requires  the aforesaid  vessels  to  obtain prior  authorization  of passage before entering the 
territorial sea of the Kingdom until such time as the international agreements referred to in 
article 23 are concluded and the Kingdom becomes a party thereto. Under all circumstances, 
the flag State of such vessels shall assume all responsibility for any loss or damage resulting 
from the innocent passage of such vessels within the territorial sea of the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia.”
Yemen
 “2. The Yemen Arab Republic adheres to the concept of general international law concerning 
free passage as applying exclusively to merchant ships and aircraft; nuclear-powered craft, as 
well as warships and warplanes in general, must obtain the prior agreement of the Yemen 
Arab Republic before passing through its territorial waters, in accordance with the established 
norm of general international law relating to national sovereignty.”
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APPENDIX II: CHILE’S LAW FOR NUCLEAR SAFETY
The following excerpt is Art 4 of Chile’s law for Nuclear Safety.204 It  is cited in original 
language as amended to this date. Emphasis is added by the author of this thesis; as well as 
the (unauthorized) translation into English below. 
Art.  4. Para  el  emplazamiento,  construcción,  puesta  en  servicio,  operación,  cierre  y 
desmantelamiento,  en  su  caso,  de  las  instalaciones,  plantas,  centros,  laboratorios, 
establecimientos y equipos nucleares y para el ingreso o tránsito por el territorio nacional,  
zona económica exclusiva, mar presencial y espacio aéreo nacional de sustancias nucleares o 
materiales radiactivos se  necesitará autorización de la Comisión, con las formalidades y en 
las condiciones que se determinan en esta ley y en sus reglamentos. Las centrales nucleares de 
potencia, las plantas de enriquecimiento, las plantas de reprocesamiento y los depósitos de 
almacenamiento  permanente  de  desechos radiactivos,  deberán  ser  autorizados  por  decreto 
supremo, expedido por intermedio del Ministerio de Minería. 
Para  el  otorgamiento  de  dichas  autorizaciones  deberán  considerarse,  en  todo  caso,  las 
condiciones que permitan preservar un medio ambiente libre de contaminación. En el caso de 
la autorización para el transporte de las sustancias señaladas en el inciso primero, se deberá 
dejar  constancia  de las fechas en que éste  se  efectuará,  las  rutas y  áreas a utilizar,  las  
características de la carga y las medidas de seguridad y de contingencia.
No podrá autorizarse  el  almacenamiento  de desechos nucleares  o radiactivos  en territorio 
nacional, salvo que se produzcan u originen en él. 
Art. 4. For the siting, construction, renovation, operation, closing and dismantling of facilities, 
nuclear  plants,  centers,  laboratories,  establishments  or  equipment  and  for  the entrance or 
transit through the national territory, exclusive economic zone, territorial sea and national 
airspace of radioactive nuclear  or material  substances  authorization of  the Commission is  
necessary, with the formalities and under the conditions that are determined in this law and its 
regulations. The nuclear power plants, the plants of enrichment, the reprocessing plants and 
permanent storage deposits of radioactive remainders, will have to be authorized by supreme 
decree, issued by interval of the Ministry of Mining. 
For the granting of these authorizations they will have to consider, in any case, the conditions 
that allow preserving an environment free of contamination. In the case of authorization to the 
transports of substances indicated in the first paragraph the applicant shall provide the dates  
of when the transport commences, the routes and areas traveled the characteristics of the  
load and the contingency and safety measures. 
The storage of nuclear or radioactive remainders in national territory will not be authorized, 
except for if they are produced or originate from there. 
204 Ley de Seguridad Nuclear, LEY Núm. 18.302, 1984 (Chile’s Law for Nuclear Safety) & Ley Núm. 19.825, 
2002 modifica la ley nº 18.302, sobre Seguridad Nuclear (amendment to Chiles Law for Nuclear Safety).
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